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INTRODUCTION
How much should an investor pay for one share of stock in Yahoo?
Or a share of stock in America Online? As publicly traded companies,
one need only consult the stock charts in any local newspaper to deter-
mine the value the market has placed on these shares. Despite what
many Internet sector analysts have professed to be astronomically high
valuations, these publicly traded companies possess easily verifiable
valuations determined by the free market forces that constitute the
building blocks of our economy, and safeguarded by the oversight of
federal regulators such as the Securities & Exchange Commission
("SEC"). But what about shares of stock in a small non-public start-up
Internet company called "FreeStockOverTheInternet.com," the owner-
ship of which is evidenced solely by cyber-shares? How much should
someone pay for a share in that company? And how does one value a
share of FreeStockOverThelnternet.com?
Since the premiere of Travelzoo.com's ("Travelzoo") offer to dis-
tribute ten shares of company stock to each individual registering on its
website and providing personal information,' numerous start-up Internet
companies have implemented similar programs (hereinafter referred to
1. Travelzoo.com Corp. (visited Aug. 29,2000) <http://www.travelzoo.com/pin.asp>.
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as "share distribution programs") as a means of publicizing their compa-
nies and luring web-traffic. At first blush, this arrangement would appear
to be a "win-win deal between mass viewers and the Internet ventures.""
As "FreeIPO.com," an Internet company seeking to establish itself as a
clearing house for free stock offers and technology support explained it,
"[t]he concept is to give away a portion of your company to the millions
of net surfers in exchange for the publicity..."
But is this stock really free? Are these companies actually offering
shares of stock, or merely the prospect of receiving shares of stock at
some indeterminate date in the future? When must these offers comply
with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 ("the
Act" or "the 1933 Act")? And what other statutes should companies op-
erating these programs take into consideration?
This Article begins, in Part I, with an analysis of various Internet-
based share distribution programs, including share distributions through
referrals, share distributions through contests or sweepstakes, and pro-
grams for the distribution of contingent interests in shares of stock. Part
II of this Article examines the value of the personal information pro-
vided by individuals when registering for shares of stock in light of the
increasing use of this information for marketing, advertising and resale
to third party information brokers. Part III begins with a review of pre-
Internet case law pertaining to the use of corporate spin-offs as a means
of distributing free shares of stock. It then analyzes the response by the
SEC to a number of companies that sought permission to distribute (and
in some cases did in fact distribute) shares of stock in exchange for the
provision of personal information. Finally, Part IV analyzes other laws
that companies should consider before offering these Internet-based
share distribution programs, and concludes that, based upon the value
attributed to personal information, certain share distribution programs
could violate state pyramid and gambling laws.
I. REVIEW OF VARIOUS FREE INTERNET STOCK OFFERS
Capitalizing on the "Internet IPO frenzy"4 to own stock in anything
that ends in a "dot com," many companies have emulated Travelzoo's
share distribution program. In fact, since the advent of Travelzoo's pro-
gram, numerous variations on this program have proliferated on the
2. FreelPO.com (visited Aug. 30, 2000) <http://www.freeipo.con>.
3. FreeIPO.com, Why Free IPO? (visited Aug. 30, 2000) <http://www.freeipo.com/
why.html>.
4. See FreelPO.com, Frequently Asked Questions (visited Aug. 30, 2000)
<www.freeipo.com/how.html>.
1999-20001
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Internet. In addition to the traditional share distribution programs, some
Internet start-ups have offered sweepstakes where lucky winners can win
shares of stock, while others have offered to distribute "reservations" for
prospective shares of stock if and when the company goes public. One
start-up company has even begun offering shares of stock through what
it terms a unique program for which it claims to have filed a patent.
A. Plain Vanilla Share Distribution Programs
WebWorksMarketing.com, Inc. ("WebWorks") began its program
on January 24, 1999, offering website registrants shares of stock as a
means of marketing its long-distance telephone service. Pursuant to
WebWorks' program, individuals could earn: (1) three shares of stock
by registering on the WebWorks website and providing personal infor-
mation; (2) an additional share of stock, up to a maximum of ten
additional shares, for each new member referred to the WebWorks
website; (3) twenty-five shares of stock in return for subscribing to the
long-distance telephone service offered by Telco Communications
Group, Inc. ("Telco"); and (4) an additional twenty-five shares of stock
in return for remaining a customer of Telco for six months.' Approxi-
mately four months after implementing its program, WebWorks claimed
to have issued 1,000,000 shares of stock to registered visitors worth, ac-
cording to what the company referred to as a "complex equation,"
$38.40 a share once the company goes public.'
On March 21, 1999, Internet auction firm WowAuction.com, Inc.
("WowAuction") began offering its own share distribution program
through which individuals could receive three shares of stock in ex-
change for registering on its website.7 WowAuction also offered an
additional share of stock, up to seven additional shares of stock, in return
for each referral that listed the newly registered member as a reference
when registering.8 Finally, WowAuction offered registered members the
chance to be one of five winners of 10,000 shares of WowAuction stock
in a drawing to be held at some future date. According to WowAuction's
website, the share distribution program was supposed to last until Sep-
tember 15, 1999, or until WowAuction distributed a total of 500,000
shares of stock.9 Although WowAuction did not provide a valuation for
its stock, which according to its website was supposed to go public dur-
ing the third quarter of 1999, it did offer potential valuations by way of
5. See WebWorksMarketing.com, Inc., on file with MTILR.
6. Id.
7. See WowAuction.com, Inc., on fie with M'R.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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comparisons to the purchase prices of various real-world auction houses,
including the purchase of City Auction by Ticketmaster for approxi-
mately $54 million. ' °
YouNetwork Corp. ("YouNetwork") holds the distinction of being
one of the first start-up Internet companies to file a registration statement
for its share distribution program with the SEC." According to its regis-
tration statement, YouNetwork intends to operate a "Consumer
Network" shopping website, through which consumers will be able to
link to various retailers and make purchases. 2 In order to promote traffic
to its website and encourage individuals to make purchases, YouNet-
work proposes to give away 1,000,000 shares of Class A stock to
visitors who register with its website, and 1,000,000 shares of Class B
stock to individuals who earn rebates accumulated by making purchases
through its Consumer Network. 3
B. Share Distribution Programs with a Twist
As a variation on the traditional share distribution program, Exit-
North.com, Inc. ("ExitNorth") offered to distribute 10,000 shares of
stock, through a contest, to each of ten "lucky winners."'4 In order to
enroll in this contest, ExitNorth required website visitors to provide per-
sonal information during the registration process. ExitNorth also offered
registered members the opportunity to increase their chances of winning
by referring other individuals to register for the contest."5 According to
its website, ExitNorth was apparently engaged in the business of selling
long-distance telephone service for Uni-Tel Global Communications.
6
C. Contingent Share Distribution Programs
Instead of distributing actual shares of stock, some Internet compa-
nies offer visitors the opportunity to register for contingent shares of
stock that are to be distributed upon the occurrence of some future event.
For example, PopularLink.com ("Popular Link"), a shopping portal for
car enthusiasts, game players, and sword, gun and knife collectors, offers
individuals the opportunity to register on its website to receive either
10. Id.
11. See YouNetwork Corp., SEC Registration Statement SB-2 (filed Feb. 5, 1999)
<http:/Avww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal1078306/0000950136-99-000152.txt>.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See ExitNorth.com, Inc. (visited Aug. 30, 2000) <http://www.exitnorth.com>; contest
pages on file with MTTLR.
15. Id.
16. Id.
1999-2000]
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reservation numbers for 5 shares of stock, or a $25 cash bonus. 7 Popular
Link also offers reservation numbers for additional shares of stock to
registered members who refer others to the website.' According to an
explanation provided by Popular Link on its website, reservation num-
bers "will be paid or converted to actual issued stock numbers after
Popular Link successfully file[s] with the SEC for [an] IPO (initial pub-
lic offering)."' 9
Similarly, Himmel Technology, LLC operates a website called
Tradehall.com ("Tradehall"), which is designed to function as a "global
trading network" through which people can place items up for auction
and others can bid on those items.20 Akin to Popular Link's program,
instead of offering actual shares of stock to individuals who register on
its website, Tradehall "contemplat[es] rewarding its registered members
with equity shares in the company free of charge if and when it becomes
a public entity."2' Additionally, Tradehall professes to be "considering"
distributing an extra one-half share of stock to each registered member
who refers someone to the Tradehall website3
In yet another variation on the original theme, Lifestyle Travel Con-
cepts ("Lifestyle") asks visitors to register for "25 stock options" that it
will issue "upon the commencement of our IPO," as well as for a free
weekly online travel magazine 3 Although the actual exercise price of
the stock options are "as of yet undetermined ... the range should be
between $0.40 and $1.00 per option" depending "on the overall value of
the initial offering and the number of shares authorized."24 Visitors can
also earn "an additional 25 stock options whenever any qualified person
registers for our Free Stock Offer" and lists the newly registered member
as a referral."
Among one of the more interesting stock distribution programs is an
Internet portal website called MyGo.com ("MyGo"). MyGo offers indi-
viduals the opportunity to register for shares of stock in the company,
and to win up to 1000 additional shares of stock by qualifying as one of
the top 300 members to refer people to the MyGo website.6 What makes
17. See PopularLink.com (visited Aug. 30,2000) <http://wwwl.freeipo.com/popularlink/
stepl.html> (now offering only $25 bonus after successful IPO); older offer on file with
MTLR.
18. l
19. Id.
20. See Tradehall.com, on file with MT=rR.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. LifestyleTravel.net, on file with MTTLR.
24. I&
25. l
26. See MyGo.com, on file with MTTLR.
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this offer so interesting is that at the time MyGo began offering these
shares of stock in its company, it was not even an incorporated entity,
although it did profess on its website to have plans to "complete this
process shortly after all free shares have been given away."27 In fact, by a
notice posted on its website dated July 10, 1999, MyGo claimed to have
distributed free shares of stock in the company to 20,000 individuals,
although it still remained unincorporated as of September 13, 1999. 2
D. Another "Unique" Twist On the Traditional
Share Distribution Program
In what it characterizes as an entirely "unique" method for distrib-
uting shares of stock, a personal portal website operated by
MyOwnEmpire, Inc. ("MyOwnEmpire") offers to distribute a single
share of stock to each visitor that registers on its website and who then
makes MyOwnEmpire's website her start page and visits the site at least
ten days out of every 30 days for a 90 day period." A user can also earn
up to an additional four shares of stock by referring other people to the
MyOwnEmpire website.3 In an apparent attempt to avoid having its
share distribution program classified as a sale under the 1933 Act, My-
OwnEmpire tries to remove the emphasis of the program on the
registration process by conditioning the stock distribution on a member's
utilization of its website.3 According to its website, MyOwnEmpire
claims to be operating the program "pursuant to an exemption provided
by rule 504 of regulation D as promulgated by the SEC under federal
law, and also pursuant to California Corporation Code Section
25113(b)(I)., 3
2
II. WHAT VALUE Do THESE SHARE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS
PROVIDE To INTERNET COMPANIES?
A. Is There Value in the Personal Information
Provided by Website Visitors?
A poll conducted in early 1999 of Chief Technology Officers from
some of the top technology firms around the country revealed that over
27. Id.
28. kL
29. See MyOwnEmpire, Inc., on file with MTrLR.
30. Il
31. Id. MyOwnEmpire believes its method of share distributions to be so unusual that it
has apparently filed for a patent on its consumer-owner business model.
32. IL
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60% of those surveyed believed that the personal information collected
from Internet consumers was "critical to their business success."33 In es-
sence, this poll confirmed that the personal information collected from
individuals has become a valuable commodity to both the businesses that
host these websites, as well as to third party marketers that purchase this
information.
Utilizing basic supply and demand principles, the value of this in-
formation is best illustrated by the amount of money that companies are
willing to pay to acquire it. For example, after filing for bankruptcy,
Toysmart.com, Inc. ("Toysmart") received a number of bids for one of
its most valuable assets, its database of customers' personal information,
including a bid of $50,000 from the Walt Disney Company, the majority
owner of Toysmart34 "The average return for a dollar spent on direct-
mail advertising is ten dollars, more than twice the return when com-
pared with television commercials. 3 5 Electronic marketing could
potentially be even more lucrative. "According to one estimate, direct-
marketing-generated electronic commerce could rise to $30 billion by
2002."36
In addition to utilizing this information for marketing purposes,
many companies also sell this personal information to other companies,
securing additional revenues from the very same information. "Indeed,
with profit margins of up to sixty percent, some companies reportedly
earn more from selling customer lists than from selling their own goods
or services. 37 In recognition of this fact, a number of companies in 1999
began offering free computers to consumers in exchange for their per-
sonal information, including demographic information and information
about their shopping habits.38 Some companies have allegedly even pur-
sued merger agreements with other companies because of the lists of
31information they possess.
With the advent of technology-driven business models that now
have the ability to link disparate pieces of information into detailed
33. CIO Magazine Poll Shows CTOs Grapple with Double Standard on Internet Privacy
Regulations, PR NEwswiRE, Mar. 31, 1999.
34. Judge Shelves Plan for Sale of Online Customer Database, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2000, at C2.
35. Jeff Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, Or No Options At All: The Fight For Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1051 (1999).
36. 1d. at 1047.
37. Id. at 1045.
38. See Kim Komando, Personal Information a Hot Item These Days, FRESNO BEE, Oct.
4, 1999, at C2.
39. See Sovern, supra note 35, at 1046.
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"dossiers," the value of this information has continued to rise.40 One
commentator, John Hagel Ill, co-author of Net Worth, has surmised,
"[t]he most valuable economic asset of these Internet businesses is the
profiles-the ability to capture information about the customer and use it
for economic purposes. The profile is really the core business assump-
tion., 4 Even some governments have recognized the value of personal
information, having turned to selling this information as a means of
boosting revenues. For example, "Illinois raises $10 million annually
from the sale of public records," while "New York takes in more than
$49 million by selling information on motorists ....,,42 In fact, the U.S.
Postal Service even sells its listing of 108 million permanent change-of-
address cards to direct marketers.43
Although the potential uses of personal information have continued
to increase, "it is becoming easier and less expensive to obtain access to
it."4 Nonetheless, the mere fact that the per unit cost of acquiring the
information has dropped does not in any way detract from its value to
the companies. The multiple marketing and advertising opportunities
created by the information clearly demonstrate value to the company in
possession of the information.
As a result of this value, many businesses have gone to great lengths
to acquire and utilize the information to their competitive advantage,
sometimes at the peril of violating federal or state law. For example, in
February 1999, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") sanctioned
GeoCities for selling valuable personal information collected from its
members, despite its posted privacy policy that promised to keep this
information confidential. 46 Similarly, in November 1999, Real Networks
found itself the subject of irate consumer sentiment and class-action law-
suits when consumers discovered that the company had been assigning
identification numbers to its software that it could then utilize to track
the listening habits of its Real Jukebox users and compile detailed in-
formation profiles of those usersf
40. See Erica S. Koster, Zero Privacy: Personal Data on the Internet, 16 No. 5 Com-
PUTER LAW. 7, 10 (1999).
41. Kenneth Neil Cukier, Is There a Privacy Time Bomb, RED HERRING, Sept. 1999, at
38.
42. Koster, supra note 40, at 8-9.
43. Id at 9.
44. See Sovem, supra note 35, at 1037.
45. See infra, text accompanying notes 84-94.
46. See GeoCities, Docket No. C-3849 (Feb. 12, 1999) (Final Decision and Order avail-
able at http:livww.ftc.gov/os/19991990219823015d&o.htm).
47. See Paul Gilster, Real Netvorks' Real Big Mistake, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC)
Nov. 22, 1999, at D4 (noting that as a result of the company's activities, at least two class-
action lawsuits had already been filed: one in Pennsylvania and one in California).
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In the hopes of curtailing improper collection and use of consumers'
personal information without legislative intervention, many industry
groups have called for industry self-regulation.4' Likewise, certain gov-
ernmental agencies have also expressed a preference for self-regulation
over legislation. Throughout 1999, the FTC repeatedly urged the Internet
community to police its use of personal information, having conducted
numerous audits of various websites to determine the level of compli-
ance with what it deemed acceptable privacy practices. 9 In July 1999,
the FTC released a Report to Congress on the progress of industry self-
regulation. As the FTC recognized, two of the more notable industry
responses were: (1) the proliferation of privacy organizations such as
Truste (www.truste.com) and the BBBonline (www.BBBonline.com),
both of which review websites and provide seals of approval to sites that
comply with their privacy standards; and (2) the adoption of policing
and complaint resolution requirements.5' Yet even these website privacy
certification organizations have not escaped criticism. For example, de-
spite Real Networks' having been caught red-handed inappropriately
collecting and utilizing consumers' personal information, Truste relied
upon a technicality in order to refuse to revoke the seal of approval it
had previously bestowed upon Real Networks, thereby raising accusa-
tions of bias and self-interest. 52
Less than a year after the FTC concluded that legislative interven-
tion was unwarranted, however, the FTC reversed its position. In its
Report to Congress on May 22, 2000, the FTC, recognizing that the lure
of unlocking the value intrinsic in this personal information was too
great for some companies to resist, recommended that Congress enact
legislation "to empower the FTC to pass rules requiring websites to give
notice of their information practices, to allow individuals to control how
their data is used, to allow individuals to access and correct their data
48. See, e.g., On the Web You Have No Secrets, PC WoRLD, July 1, 1999, at 22 (The On-
line Privacy Alliance, a group composed of more than 80 businesses, was launched in July
1998 to promote self-regulation as a solution to privacy concerns); Culder, supra note 41, at
39 ("As a result of pressure from consumers and privacy advocates, the World Wide Web
Consortium, a standards forum, has issued a draft specification called Platform for Privacy
Preferences, or P3P.").
49. See Self-Regulation and Privacy Online, Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade,
and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (1999) (Statement
of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 9-1.2.
52. See Gilster, supra note 47. Specifically, Truste avoided revoking Real Networks' seal
by alleging that Real Networks had not violated Truste's policies because the "data wasn't
being collected on a Web site." Id.
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and to require security measures."53 Even with the FTC's reversal, how-
ever, there remains a lack of consensus on how best to deal with the
increasing value placed upon personal information by corporate Amer-
ica. For example, even after the FTC's Report, Secretary of Commerce
William Daley reiterated the Clinton Administration's position that new
legislation with regard to privacy was unnecessary.-4 It is still unclear
whether the self-regulatory or legislative models will ultimately become
the restraining force behind the use of personal information."
Concurrent with E-commerce's attempt at self-regulation, a number
of bills aimed at protecting personal information and regulating its col-
lection, maintenance and use have already been introduced in Congress.
In 1999, the 106th Congress saw the introduction of numerous bills de-
signed to protect valuable personal information, including the Consumer
Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1999 (H.R. 313), which "would regu-
late the use by ISPs of their subscriber's personal data"; the Children's
Privacy Protection and Parental Empowerment Act of 1999 (H.R. 369),
which would "prohibit the sale of personal information about children
under the age of sixteen without their consent"; and the Financial Infor-
mation Privacy Act of 1999 (H.R. 30), which "would regulate the
sharing and sale of personally identifiable sensitive financial information
by financial institutions."5 Even the Executive Office, while maintaining
its call for self-regulation, has expressed concern over the temptation to
collect, maintain and use this valuable personal information, leading to
the Clinton administration's "appoint[ment of] Ohio State University
law professor Peter Swire as its Chief Counselor for Privacy" and the
hosting of a major conference on Internet policy guidelines at the White
House in June 1999.
57
In fact, the value of this personal information has become so integral
to the continued success of numerous businesses, that businesses have
actually begun to view this personal information not merely as intangi-
ble electronic bytes of data, but rather as a valuable asset-a piece of
53. FTC Seeks Authority To Regulate Online Privacy, TECH LAW JOURNAL, May 23,
2000 <http://wvw.techlawjoumal.com/privacy/20000523.htm> (emphasis added) (two of the
five FTC Commissioners dissented).
54. Id.
55. Some believe that self-regulation is inevitable because the ever-increasing value of
this personal information will create an incentive for many companies to "husband the data
like a trade secret rather than disseminate it to the highest bidder." See Cukier, supra note 41.
56. See Koster, supra note 40, at 11. All three bills were still in committee as of August
2000.
57. Id.; see also Internet Commerce Said to be in Danger, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 20,
1999, at A13.
1999-2000]
100 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 6:89
property for which they have begun to seek legal protection."' The case
of U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., decided by the Tenth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, is instructive in this regard. 9
The dispute in U.S. West centered around regulations that the Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("F.C.C.") promulgated in order to
implement the Telecommunication Act of 1996.0 Specifically, these
F.C.C. regulations required "telecommunications companies, in most
instances, to obtain affirmative approval from a customer before the
company [used] that customer's CPNI [customer proprietary network
information] for marketing purposes.' Customer proprietary network
information is statutorily defined as "(A) information that relates to the
quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, and amount of a tele-
communications service subscribed to by any customer ... and (B)
information contained in the bills pertaining to a telephone exchange
service or telephone tool service received by a customer .. ."" In es-
sence, CPNI consists not so much of the data explicitly supplied by
customers, but rather of "highly personal data ... gathered only as a by-
product of subscribing to their services-without the subscribers'
explicit permission. ' 63
In arguing against the restrictions placed upon the use of CPNI, a
coalition of telecommunication providers led by U.S. West asserted that
these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to commercial
free speech.64 U.S. West also asserted that the CPNI information repre-
sented "valuable property" that belonged to the carriers.6 As such, U.S.
West argued that the F.C.C.'s prohibition on the use of this information
"greatly diminish[ed] its value" and actually rose to the level of a
"taking" in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
66
58. See Komando, supra note 38 ("Individual consumer information is a hot commodity
these days ...."); Cuider, supra note 41 ("The value of personal information is uncontested.
Many Net companies are discovering that the most potentially lucrative asset in their business
model isn't the products they sell but the data they collect about their visitors ... Personal
information is becoming so lucrative that it is creating a seller's market ...."); see also John
Davidson, Your PC is Having a Clandestine Affair, AuSrL. Fin. REv., Nov. 4, 1999, at 39 ("In
this information-based shopping revolution, information privacy becomes your most precious,
precarious asset, your bargaining chip.").
59. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom., Com-
petition Policy Inst. v. U.S. West, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2215 (2000).
60. Id. at 1228-29.
61. Id. at 1228.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 222(F)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
63. Denise Caruso, Consumers' Desire For Information Privacy ignored, N.Y. Tmys,
Aug. 30, 1999, at C5.
64. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1230.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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As the New York Times reported:
... [i]n a 2-1 ruling published on August 18 [1999], which has
obvious implications for the data-hungry Internet economy, the
10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said that rules protecting
consumers from having information like the numbers they call
and the services they subscribe to used without their permission
interfered with the phone companies' First Amendment rights to
free speech.6'
Because the court found the F.C.C. regulations to be violative of the
First Amendment, it never addressed the Fifth Amendment challenge.
Nonetheless, U.S. West's Fifth Amendment challenge illustrates the fact
that corporate America has begun to acknowledge the value of this per-
sonal consumer information as an asset, and has elevated the status of
this information to that of legally cognizable property for which it has
asked the courts to provide constitutional protection.
More recently, Toysmart's attempted sale of its personal information
database in order to pay off its creditors demonstrated the value of this
information.
Toysmart, which has sold toys and educational merchandise via
its Web site since January 1999, announced on May 22, 2000,
that it had ceased operations and retained the services of a man-
agement consultant to find one or more buyers who would be
interested in acquiring the company's assets. Those assets in-
cluded its database containing personal information about
customers. 68
Subsequent to Toysmart's announcement, its creditors filed a peti-
tion for involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy.69 "Facing bankruptcy ... the
online toy retailer said it was going to sell its most valuable asset-
customers' names, addresses and order histories., 70 As an illustration of
the value of this personal information, in July 2000, Toysmart rejected
two offers to purchase this personal information, "including one of
67. See Caruso, supra note 63.
68. Privacy: Federal Trade Comm'n v. Toysmart.com-FTC Files First Enforcement Ac-
tion Under New Child Privacy Law, COMPUTER AND ONLINE INDUSTRY LITIG. REP., Aug. 1,
2000, at 9-10.
69. Id.
70. Keith Perine, Who Are the Privacy Police?, THE STANDARD, Aug. 7, 2000
<http://www.thestandard.comarticle/display/0,1151,17324,00.html> (emphasis added).
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$50,000 from a unit of the Walt Disney Company, the majority owner of
Toysmart.com."7'1
Toysmart's attempt to capitalize on the value of this personal infor-
mation has had reverberations across the United States and Europe. In
July 2000, as a direct result of Toysmart's attempted sale of customer
information, Senators Patrick Leahy and Robert Torricelli introduced
what has been dubbed "The Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy
Act of 2000," which would bar the sale of personally identifiable infor-
72
mation by bankrupt businesses. As Samuel Gerdano, Executive
Director at the American Bankruptcy Institute aptly pointed out, "dot-
coms ... don't have patents, or a factory. They have a name and a list.
That's about all they've got going for them."73 Even England, alarmed
by the potential abuses of this valuable information, has been drafting
legislation to deal with the sale of personal information databases by
bankrupt companies.7
Despite the Toysmart case, the sale of personal information contin-
ues to flourish. Capitalizing on the growing popularity of Internet
auction sites, a company called Market Logistics Group made numerous
attempts in early August 2000 to sell "a mailing list with the names, ad-
dresses and phone numbers of more than 200,000 active U.S. investors,
before being shut down by eBay and Yahoo."75 While federal and state
regulators continue to struggle with methods for protecting consumers'
personal information from inappropriate use and disclosure, the con-
tinuing attempts by companies to sell this personal information only
strengthens the premise that this personal information possesses signifi-
cant intrinsic value.
71. Judge Shelves Plan for Sale of Online Customer Database, supra note 34 ("Other
bankrupt dot-corn companies have [also] sold their customer data, though Craftshop.com, an
arts and crafts retailer, also withdrew its list from sale last month [July 2000].").
72. Brian Krebs, Lawmakers Intro Privacy Bill in Wake of Toysmart Scandal, NExvs-
BYTES, July 12, 2000 <http:lwww.newsbytes.comlpubNews/00/152015.html> (noting that
Representatives William Delahunt and Spencer Bachus also introduced a bill in the House
which "would give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the express right to investigate and
bring actions against websites that violate their own privacy policies.").
73. Doug Brown, White House Studies Bankruptcy Privacy, INTERAcrIVE WEEK, Aug. 7,
2000 <http:llwww.zdnet.comlintweeklstories/news/0,4164,2612068,00.html> (emphasis
added).
74. Regulator to Draft Database Sale Guidelines, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 18, 2000, at 8.
75. Stefanie Olson, eBay, Yahoo Nix Auctions of Personal Data, CNET, Aug. 7, 2000
<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-2457350.html>.
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B. What Other Value Is Created For Companies Through
These Share Distribution Programs?
In addition to the intrinsic value of the personal information itself,
share distribution programs also provide other types of value to the of-
fering companies. As one start-up Internet company disclosed in its
registration statement with the SEC, "the principal competitive factors"
that a start-up Internet company may contend with are: "number of
members; . .. quality of merchandise and retailers; ... brand recogni-
tion; member loyalty; ... [and] broad demographic focus .... ,76
Businesses can use share distribution programs to satisfy each of these
goals.
The goals of increasing website membership and promoting member
loyalty are facilitated through share distribution programs because
"equity ownership in [a] company will help establish [the company] as a
preferred destination among web users" and will help "to rapidly attract
a sizeable membership base." As BonusBoulevard, Inc. ("Bonus
Blvd."), a New York based start-up Internet company explained, "[t]he
purpose of the [share distribution] offering is not to raise capital directly
but to create interest in, traffic to, and purchasing through, our online
shopping mall., 7' Additionally, YouNetwork explains that these share
distribution programs can also further the goal of enhancing brand rec-
79ognition in start-up Internet companies.
The competitive goals of increasing the quality and variety of the
retailers associated with a website are also dependent, at least in part, on
expanding the membership base because the more prestigious Internet
retailers will generally want to be associated with the more popular,
higher-traffic websites.80 As MyOwnEmpire explains on its website,
"Internet companies are after one thing, your eyeballs, and we must ad-
mit we are no different (except we cut you in 'big time' on the deal)."'"
The maintenance of relationships with a large number of retailers,
76. BonusBoulevard, Inc., SEC Registration Statement SB-2/A (filed Sept. 3, 1999)
<http:/lwww.sec.gov/Archivesedgarldatal1089471/0000950117-99-001884-index.html> at
13.
77. YouNetwork Corp., SEC Registration Statement SB-2/A (filed July 13, 1999)
<http:/www.sec.gov/ArcWhives/ edgar/data/1078306/0000950136-99-000955-index.html> at
18.
78. BonusBoulevard, supra note 76, at 21.
79. See YouNetwork, supra note 11, at 32.
80. Id. at 13.
81. SeeMyOwnEmpire, supra note 29, "About My Own Empire-Share Value"
webpage, at 3; see also Cukier, supra note 41 ("According to a 1998 study of online retailing
by the Boston Consulting Group and Shop.org, an association of online merchants, 65 percent
of revenues derived from e-commerce sites is re-invested in marketing and advertising-a bid
to grab eyeballs.").
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known in the industry as "affiliate relationships," also provides a direct
monetary benefit to many of these start-up Internet companies82 because
they can earn commissions on purchases made by customers for whom
they are responsible for referring, or linking, to the websites of these
retailers.83
As discussed above, one of the greatest potential uses of the personal
information collected through these share distribution programs is for
marketing and advertising. Although some start-up Internet companies
require nothing more than the provision of a visitor's name, street ad-
dress, and electronic mail ("E-mail") address, even this basic
information can provide a number of valuable benefits to these compa-
nies.'
First, this registration information provides a list of active E-mail
addresses to which a company can E-mail information and marketing
offers for a small fraction of what it would ordinarily cost to market
these people by mail.85 "The information typically collected allows busi-
nesses the chance to increase the effectiveness of their direct marketing
campaigns, which may translate into higher sales."86
Second, some of the more specialized websites gain an additional
benefit from registering members, in that special interest members are
prime advertising targets for companies engaged in the sale of specialty
products. For example, as Popular Link asserts on its website,
"PopularLink.com is a site for mature and 'cool' people. If you are in
any way offended by our products, do not apply for free shares." 87 Ac-
cordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that at least a percentage of the
visitors who register on Popular Link's website are interested in swords,
guns, knives and other similar collectibles, thus making those registered
members prime candidates for direct marketing by companies selling
those types of products. Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that
82. As described in Bonus Blvd.'s SB-2/A filing:
[a]ffiiate relationships ... involve a form of marketing based on revenue sharing
between a retailer and other web site owners known as affiliates. When an affiliate
relationship is established, the affiliate's web site is linked electronically to the web
site of a retailer. When prospective customers visit the affiliate's web site, they may
chose to be linked to, and then may make a purchase at, the retailer's web site. The
retailer then pays a commission, which ordinarily equals a percentage of the amount
of the purchases made.
See supra note 76, at 24-25.
83. Id. at 30; see also YouNetwork, supra note 77, at 19.
84. See Lifestyle, supra note 23; Popular Link, supra note 17.
85. See YouNetwork, supra note 77, at 24; see also Sovem, supra note 35, at 1045.
86. YouNetwork, supra note 77, at 24.
87. Popular Link, supra note 17.
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individuals who take the time to visit and register for free shares on
Lifestyle's website are interested in travel and tourism opportunities.
The value of the personal information is even greater when the com-
pany is able to collect detailed information about the registered visitors
in addition to the basic registration information such as name and E-mail
address..8 For example, in order to register for shares of stock in Exit-
North, visitors must provide not only their name, street address and E-
mail address, but also information about their calling patterns and the
long-distance fees that they incur." The ability to target and directly
market the sale of long-distance telephone services is becoming an in-
creasingly valuable commodity in the highly competitive world of long-
distance phone carriers.9
Similarly, MyOwnEmpire's collection of information about a user's
sex and birth date, along with the optional information that it collects
about a user's income, occupation, and level of education, helps to create
a valuable and much sought after database that it can use for its own
marketing programs, for attracting additional retailers and advertisers, or
for reselling to third party marketers.9 Indeed, MyOwnEmpire freely
discloses the value of this information:
MyOwnEmpire makes money from: (1) advertisements; (2) re-
selling great products and services just like other portals do; (3)
sending you to sites that pay us a commission for listing them
just like other portals do. The difference is we TELL you when
we are making money off of you instead of pretending we are
presenting information just to be helpful ... The more we know
about you, the more relevant ads we can show you. The more
relevant ads we can show you, the more advertisers are willing
to pay bigger bucks for that ad because they know there is a
chance you'll actually be interested.92
In addition to the immediate advertising and marketing value of at-
tracting members, there is an additional benefit to these share
distribution programs that accrues over time. Specifically, as a member
88. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 35, at 1034-35.
89. See ExitNorth, supra note 14.
90. See, e.g., New Millennium Certain to Bring Continued Change in the Communica-
tions Arena; Expect to See Increased Competition and a Sustained Focus on Customer Issues
in All Industry Segments, BUSINESS EDITORS, Dec. 21, 1999, at 14.
91. See MyOwnEmpire, supra note 29. YouNetwork likewise collects detailed informa-
tion about the people registering for free shares, including name, address, E-mail address,
home and work phone numbers, company name and age group. See YouNetwork, supra note
11.
92. MyOwnEmpire, supra note 29.
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continues to visit the website and make purchases, the company is able
to collect additional information about the member's use patterns and
purchases, often referred to as "byproduct information." This byproduct
information helps to create an even more detailed user profile, which in
turn enhances the value of the information and the ability to market to
that user.9
The use of this byproduct information appears to be precisely what
YouNetwork envisioned when it discussed its marketing plan in its SEC
filing:
[w]e expect to gather a significant base of information about our
members through registration information, responses to closed
end beta tests and purchasing information obtained from third
parties. As members join us, and as we obtain purchasing history
data, the level of information regarding our members will con-
tinue to grow. We intend to use this growing database to target
offers, increase our range of product offerings, and to encourage
future transactions and involvement with our website.9
JR. SEC DETERMINATIONS REGARDING SHARE
DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS
A. Prior Precedent-Share Distributions Through
Corporate Spin-offs
The key registration provision of the 1933 Act appears in Section
5(c):
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to
make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to
sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus
or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed as to such security.... .5
Pursuant to Section 2(a)(3) of the Act, "[t]he term 'sale' or 'sell'
shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest
in a security, for value."96
93. See Komando, supra note 38, at C2 ("Since the greatest value in your personal data
lies in how it can be used to get you to buy more stuff, the details of your shopping habits are
the most valuable."); Sovem, supra note 35, at 1038-40; see also U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1224.
94. YouNetwork, supra note 77, at 25.
95. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(c) (1997).
96. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(3) (1997).
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Although questions regarding the application of the Act's registra-
tion requirements to Internet-based share distribution programs is of
relatively recent vintage, questions regarding their applicability to corpo-
rate spin-off programs date back over a quarter of a century, well before
the Internet represented the consumer paradigm that it does today. The
SEC first challenged the application of these registration requirements to
corporate stock distributions in the Southern District of New York in
1971 in SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp.97 As District Judge Mansfield syn-
opsized:
[i]n this action the Securities and Exchange Commission ("the
Commission") seeks to plug up what some have treated as a
loophole in the federal securities laws permitting a company, by
'spinning-off' its subsidiary's shares to the parent's stockholders
without registration, to convert the subsidiary into a public cor-
poration whose unregistered shares would be actively traded on
the market."
The scheme utilized by Harwyn Industries Corp. ("Harwyn") oc-
curred in three stages. First, Harwyn, with its over-the counter stock and
approximately 600 public shareholders, would incorporate various sub-
sidiaries." Harwyn would then enter negotiations with various private
companies resulting in agreements wherein the Harwyn subsidiaries
would acquire the assets of the private companies "in exchange for issu-
ance of controlling interests in the subsidiaries to those contributing such
assets ... "0 The second stage of the scheme involved "the 'spin-off'
distribution by the parent, Harwyn, to its stockholders of the unregis-
tered shares of its subsidiar[ies] ... ."'' The third stage of this scheme
involved "the development of an over-the-counter trading market in the
unregistered shares thus spun-off," the shares being quoted on the over-
the counter listings, or "pink sheets," published by the National Quota-
tions Bureau.'02 In at least two of these spin-offs, an authorized
representative of Harwyn sent some type of notice to the National Quo-
tations Board prior to the listing of these shares on the pink sheets.03
In reviewing the propriety of Harwyn's issuance of these spin-off
shares, the court first compared Harwyn's spin-off to a conventional
stock dividend: "[w]here a conventional stock dividend of its own shares
97. 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
98. Id. at 945.
99. Id. at 946-51.
100. Id. at 945.
101. Id.
102. Id at 946.
103. Id. at 946, 950.
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is distributed by a public company that has complied with the registra-
tion requirements of the 1933 Act, subsequent purchasers of the shares
have the benefit of detailed financial information about the company
making possible informed investment decisions on their part."' In con-
trast, Harwyn's distribution did not involve a conventional stock
dividend, but rather, the effect of the spin-off was "to convert a Harwyn
subsidiary into a publicly held company, with the shares thus distributed
to outside stockholders" without the benefit of "detailed financial infor-
mation about the company."'0 5 As the court noted, the spin-offs violated
the "spirit and purpose" of the registration requirements of Section 5 of
the 1933 Act, which were enacted to protect investors by promoting the
full disclosure necessary to make informed investment decisions.""
The court then went on to analyze whether the spin-offs constituted
sales under Section 5 of the 1933 Act. The court initially noted that the
defendants received two distinct benefits as a result of the spin-offs.
First, they avoided registration costs.'0 7 Second, the court noted that
"although they [the Harwyn officers] could not, as insiders, publicly sell
their own shares without registration, their ability to market or hypothe-
cate their shares and to finance the subsidiary's operations could be
greatly facilitated by the existence of an active trading market at definite
prices."'0 8 As such, the court ruled that a sale of shares took place be-
cause the defendants received value as a result of the spin-offs.
In their defense, the defendants asserted that they had acted in reli-
ance upon what had become generally perceived as a "long-standing
loophole" in the 1933 Act,'09 namely that the distribution of spin-off
shares by a parent corporation was deemed to be a stock dividend, not a
sale, because the value received by the parent corporation as a result of
the spin-off did not come directly from the share recipients."0 In re-
sponse, the court stated that there was no reason to believe "that the
'value' requiring registration must flow from the immediate parties who
received the stock, in this case Harwyn's shareholders."'' . Instead, the
court deemed the spin-off transactions to be "intimately" tied to the
agreements between Harwyn's subsidiaries and the private companies,
104. l at 952 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 952-53.
106. Id. at 953. In conducting its analysis, the court also noted that in the case of each
spin-off, the defendants had available all of the pertinent information had they actually wanted
to file a registration statement.
107. Id. at 952.
108. Id. at 952-53.
109. laat 953.
110. Ia at 953-54.
111. Id. at 954.
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agreements that contemplated the infusion of new value into the subsidi-
aries and the eventual public trading of their shares."2 Viewing the share
distributions as part of the overall transactions, and the fact that "value"
did in fact accrue to Harwyn as a result of these transactions, the court
ruled that the defendants should have registered the shares under Section
5 of the 1933 Act.!
3
The SEC again challenged the distribution of unregistered stock
through corporate spin-offs in the Fourth Circuit in SEC v. Datronics
Engineers, Inc."4 Similar to the scheme utilized in Harwyn:
Datronics would enter into an agreement with the principals of a
private company. The agreement provided for the organization
by Datronics of a new corporation, or the utilization of one of
Datronics's [sic] subsidiaries, and the merger of the private
company into the new or subsidiary corporation. It stipulated
that the principals of the private company would receive the
majority interest in the merger-corporation. The remainder of
the stock of the corporation would be delivered to, or retained
by, Datronics for a nominal sum per share ... Datronics was
bound by each of the nine agreements to distribute among its
shareholders the rest of the stock."'
Akin to the defendants in Harwyn, the Datronics defendants argued
that the distribution of shares constituted "a dividend parceled out to
stockholders from its portfolio of investments," and not a sale, since the
distribution to shareholders was free and Datronics received no value
from the shareholders in return." 6 After reviewing the Southern District
of New York's ruling in Harwyn, the Fourth Circuit found that value had
in fact accrued to the defendants because they had created a market for
the stock through the distribution of the shares around the country,
thereby making it easier for them to sell their stock on the open market
almost immediately after they completed the spin-offs." 7 Additionally,
"the stock retained by Datronics was thereby given an added increment
112. Id.
113. Id. at 954-55. Although the court found that the defendants had violated Section 5
of the 1933 Act, the court, in its discretion, refused to order equitable relief in the form of an
injunction because: (a) Hanvyn had acted on the advice of counsel; (b) the Commission had
passed up previous opportunities to dispel the inferences which had given rise to the perceived
loophole; and (c) the defendants assured the court that they would not engage in further distri-
butions of the type in dispute. Id. at 955-58.
114. 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973).
115. Id. at 253.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 253-54.
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of value.""' The court also noted that the company reinforced the public
character of the stock by sending letters to shareholders announcing fu-
ture spin-offs, fanning even greater interest in the shares."9
In finding that the defendants violated Section 5 of the 1933 Act, the
Fourth Circuit implicitly adopted the Harwyn court's analysis of the en-
tire transaction as a means of finding value in a corporate share
distribution program. Indeed, in this case as in Harwyn, the value came
from the creation of the public market for the shares of stock, not from
the individual share recipients. Akin to the Harwyn court, the Fourth
Circuit also noted that the unregistered spin-offs violated the intent of
the 1933 Act's registration requirements, which was to provide protec-
tion to the investing public through adequate disclosure.
More than a decade after the Harwyn and Datronics decisions, the
SEC again dealt with the issue of corporate spin-offs in In the Matter of
Capital General Corp.2 ' In the Capital General case, the SEC issued
findings and a cease and desist order regarding the activities of Capital
General Corp.'s ("Capital General") President, David R. Yeaman, and
Capital General's Vice-President, Krista Castleton, who together had
incorporated approximately 92 subsidiary corporations over a period of
5 years.' Through advertisements placed in nationally circulated publi-
cations, Capital General advertised that it "had publicly-held issuers
available for merger."' ' As a result of the solicitations, Capital General
was able to transfer control of 36 of its subsidiaries to the promoters of
private companies in exchange for monetary payments, and the retention
by Yeaman and Castleton of a "substantial percentage of stock in each of
the issuers."' 24 Like the facts in the Harwyn case, once Capital General
completed the mergers between the privately held companies and its
subsidiaries, Capital General would list the newly issued stock on the
pink sheets, or on the National Association of Securities Dealers' OTC
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also Harwyn, 326 F. Supp. 943, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
121. Release No. 34-32669, [1993 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,223,
at 84,417 (July 23, 1993).
122. Id. at 84,418. Subsequent to incorporating each of these subsidiaries, Capital Gen-
eral would file a registration statement on Form 10, pursuant to § 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Capital General, Yeaman, and a number of Capital General's subsidi-
aries were also the subject of a cease and desist action by the New Jersey Bureau of Securities,
based upon their violation of New Jersey securities laws, having issued shares of unregistered,
nonexempt common stock in the Capital General subsidiaries to approximately 24 New Jersey
residents. In the Matter of Capital General Corp., Order Denying Exemptions and to Cease
and Desist, N.J. Dept. of Law and Public Safety, Div. of Consum. Aff., Bureau of Securities,
OAL Docket No. BOS 01534-94, July 14, 1994.
123. Capital General, supra note 121, at 84,420.
124. Id.
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Bulletin Board.' 5 Altogether, Capital General "distributed 100 shares of
each of at least 69 of the Capital General subsidiaries (collectively 'the
Capital General issuers') to between approximately 275 to 900 persons
throughout the United States, ostensibly as gifts," without filing regis-
tration statements pursuant to the 1933 Act.
26
As the defendants asserted in the Harwyn case, the Capital General
respondents argued that their corporate spin-offs did not implicate the
1933 Act's registration requirements because the persons receiving the
shares of stock received them for free, and were "not called upon to
make an investment judgment."' 27 Relying upon the Harwyn and
Datronics analysis of the "entire transaction," the SEC responded that
"while the spin-off itself might not be a Securities Act distribution, 'the
entire process including the redistribution in the trading market which
can be anticipated and which may indeed be the principal purpose of the
spin-off, can have that consequence.""*
Analyzing each of the transactions in its entirety, the SEC found
that: (a) Capital General and Yeaman had in fact received value by cre-
ating a public market for the securities; (b) Yeaman retained a
significant portion of the shares; and (c) "that, as a public company, the
issuer could [then] be sold for greater consideration."' 29 The SEC also
noted that there appeared to be no "independent business purpose" for
the share distributions, and that the creation of subsidiaries and the sub-
sequent distribution of their shares upon merger with privately held
companies appeared to have been the primary business of Capital Gen-
eral and Yeaman for over 5 years. 30 Citing to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Release No. 4982, the SEC again noted that devices such as
those used by Capital General are problematic because they contravene
the "purposes and provisions" of the 1933 Act, by distributing shares
without information about the issuer, thus opening the door for fraud and
deceit.'
125. lIL
126. Id In addition to registration violations, the SEC noted that Capital General had
also made various misrepresentations and had engaged in fraudulent conduct. A detailed dis-
cussion of these fraud issues, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
127. Id
128. Id (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 4982 [1968-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 177,725 (July 2, 1969)).
129. Id. at 84,424.
130. Id.
131. l
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B. Share Distribution Programs Transition Onto the Internet
Moving ahead approximately 6 years post-Capital General, the law
firm of Vanderkam & Sanders wrote to the SEC on January 15, 1999 on
behalf of an Internet company they represented. The firm sought inter-
pretive advice as to whether a program that distributes shares of stock in
return for requiring the share recipients to register on a website would
constitute an "offer" as defined in Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, such
that it would be subject to the registration requirements of Section 5232
As Mr. Sanders reasoned in his letter, "[i]nasmuch as the definition of
'offer' in Section 2(3)[sic] specifically relates to transactions in securi-
ties for 'value,' it appears that if no 'value' is given for the securities
there is no offer."' 33 Mr. Sanders further opined that he did not believe
that "the mere completion of a registration form [on a website] would
satisfy the value requirement of Section 2(3) [sic]."'34
Subsequent to the Vanderkam & Sanders letter, and prior to the
SEC's response, two additional inquiry letters were sent to the SEC,
from the American Brewing Company ("American Brewing")'35 and
from Simplystocks.com ("Simplystocks"). 36 Pursuant to a letter from
American Brewing, the company sought to distribute "one free share of
non-voting common stock for each case of American Brewing beer pur-
chased at retail."' 37 After collecting the requisite number of coupons, and
forwarding the pertinent identification information to the company, a
person would be able to redeem the coupons for a share of stock in the
American Brewing Company.33 According to American Brewing's
President, no registration of the share distribution program would be
necessary because there would be absolutely no cost to the redeemer.
39
132. See Letter from Michael Sanders, Partner, Vanderkam & Sanders, to U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (Jan. 15, 1999) (1999 WiL 38281 (S.E.C.)) (hereinafter
"Vanderkam & Sanders Letter").
133. d.
134. Id.
135. See Letter from George Poncy, President, American Brewing Company, to U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 25, 1999) (1999 WL 38280 (S.E.C.)) (hereinafter
"American Brewing Company Letter").
136. See Letter from Jay Lancy, President, Simplystocks.com, to U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Jan. 19, 1999) (1999 WL 51836 (S.E.C.)) (hereinafter "Simplystocks
Letter").
137. See American Brewing Company Letter, supra note 135.
138. Id.
139. Id. According to the American Brewing Company Letter, the most likely way it
would pass the cost on to recipients of these free shares of stock would be to raise prices, and
its restraint in not raising prices could easily be verified since any price increase would by law
have to be posted.
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Pursuant to the proposal letter from Simplystocks, individuals would
register to receive shares of stock in return for visiting the Simplystocks
website and providing their name, address, social security number,
phone number, E-mail address and log-in information.' 4 After complet-
ing the requisite registration information, individuals would be entered
into a stock pool, to which 8% of Simplystocks' shares would be distrib-
uted. An additional 2% of the shares would also be distributed to 1
individual selected from the pool, in a separate drawing. 4' Citing to pre-
vious share distribution programs, including Travelzoo's program,
Simplystocks' President invited the SEC to join the company in
"uncharted waters" and to set a precedent for the issuance of stock over
the Internet.
42
In response to these 3 No-Action Letter requests, and without citing
to any legal precedent, the SEC stated "that the issuance of securities in
consideration of a person's registration on or visit to an issuer's website
would be an event of sale within the meaning of Section 2(a)(3) of the
Securities Act of 1933," which would in turn violate Section 5 of the Act
unless the issuance was the subject of a registration statement or a valid
exemption. 43 Unfortunately, however, the SEC failed to provide guid-
ance in its response as to how it attributed value to the act of registering
with an issuer's website.
Despite the SEC's denial of these 3 No-Action Letter requests, An-
drew Jones and James Rutten wrote to the SEC on April 21, 1999
seeking permission to operate a share distribution program of their
own.' In this letter, Jones and Rutten proposed two methods for distrib-
uting shares of stock. First, a person could "use a 'mail-in' method by
sending a self-addressed stamped envelope to Beta Corp. [a fictitious
company created for illustration purposes], along with his or her name,
address and [E]-mail address ... Beta Corp. will then write back, issuing
the shares to the person and giving the person basic information about
Beta Corp .... 14' The second option would require a person to visit the
company's website and register, after which the person would be given
140. See Simplystocks Letter, supra note 136.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Letter from Michael Hyatte, Special Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, to American Brewing Company (Jan. 27, 1999) (1999 WL 38280 (S.E.C.)); see
also Letter from Michael Hyatte, Special Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
to Simplystocks.com (Feb. 4, 1999) (1999 WL 51836 (S.E.C.)).
144. See Letters from Andrew Jones and James Rutten to U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Apr. 21, 1999) (1999 WL 377873 (S.E.C.)) (hereinafter "Jones & Rutten Let-
ters").
145. Id.
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the shares of stock, as well as information about Beta Corp., the terms of
the stock offer, and other generic information. 46 In support of their pro-
posal, Jones & Rutten assured the SEC that the personal information
provided would be used "solely for corporate purposes" and would
"never be used for advertising."' 47
In a follow-up to a telephone conversation with the SEC on May 20,
1999, Jones & Rutten attempted to distinguish their share distribution
program from that of Simplystocks by claiming that "none of our pro-
spective shareholders would be required to do anything to receive
shares" and that "none of our shareholders would even be required to
visit an Internet website."'14 Nonetheless, the SEC denied Jones & Rut-
ten's request, again stating that the proposed share for stock-leave
distribution would constitute a sale, which would either need to be reg-
istered or fall within a valid exemption.
1 49
C. A Call to Action: The SEC's Response to Internet-Based
Share Distribution Programs
In spite of the SEC's well-publicized position that the distribution of
stock in return for requiring individuals to register with a website is a
sale subject to the 1933 Act's registration requirements,'O a number of
Internet companies, including WowAuction and WebWorks, proceeded
with their share distribution programs without registering. On July 21,
1999, the SEC issued 4 Cease and Desist Orders ("Orders") in connec-
tion with these share distribution programs."'
In each of the Orders, the SEC began by reviewing the statements
made by the companies on their websites in furtherance of their pro-
grams. Pursuant to the programs in In re WebWorksMarketing.com, Inc.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Letter from Andrew Jones and James Rutten to U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (May 24, 1999) (1999 WL 377873 (S.E.C.)).
149. See Letter from Michael Hyatte, Special Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, to Andrew Jones and James Rutten (June 8, 1999) (1999 WL 377873 (S.E.C.))
(denying issuance of no-action letter).
150. See, e.g., Mark Veverka, Despite Yellow Flags, New Internet Portal Plans to Give
Away Stock: MyOwnEmpire.com Thinks Its Offer Won't Irk SEC Regulators, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 7, 1999, at Dl.
151. See In re Loofbourrow, Exchange Act and Securities Act Admin. Proc. Release No.
33,7700, File No. 3-9934, 1999 WL 514038 (July 21, 1999); In re Sotirakis, Exchange Act
and Securities Act Admin. Proc. Release No. 33,7701, File No. 3-9935, 1999 WL 514040
(July 21, 1999); In re WebWorksMarketing.com, Inc., Exchange Act and Securities Act Ad-
min. Proc. Release No. 33, 7703, File No. 3-9937, 1999 WL 514083 (July 21, 1999); In re
Wowauction.com, Inc., Exchange Act and Securities Act Admin. Proc. Release No. 33,7702,
File No. 3-9936, 1999 WL 514042 (July 21, 1999).
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("WebWorks"), In re Loofbourrow ("Loofbourrow") and In re Wowauc-
tion.com, Inc. ("WowAuction"), individuals were offered the opportunity
to receive shares of stock in return for providing personal information
through a registration process.5 2 Individuals were also offered the op-
portunity to earn additional shares of stock in return for referring others
to the websites' 53 Pursuant to the WowAuction program, five registered
users were also offered the opportunity to win 10,000 shares of stock
through a drawing that was scheduled to be held on September 15,
1999.'54 Pursuant to the WebWorks program, individuals could also earn
additional shares of stock by subscribing to the long-distance service of
Telco, which the company was promoting. 5
In a minor variation on the first three programs, the program used in
In re Sotirakis ("Sotirakis") offered to distribute shares of stock to indi-
viduals in exchange for both registering with a website, called Kinesis,
and then linking their own websites to the Kinesis website.'56 Individuals
who did not have a website to link to the Kinesis website were given a
smaller number of shares for merely registering with Kinesis. 57 Indi-
viduals were also able to earn additional shares of stock by referring
others who in turn linked their websites to the Kinesis website.'5 Inter-
estingly, akin to the MyGo website discussed in Part I. C., the companies
in both Sotirakis and Loofbourrow were distributing shares of stock de-
spite the fact that neither of them had actually been incorporated in any
state.
59
After noting that Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act "defines 'sale' or
'sell' to 'include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or
interest in a security for value,"' the SEC answered the question first
posed by Vanderkam and Sanders: how a distribution of securities in
return for requiring a share recipient to register on a website would con-
stitute a "sale" of securities, implicating the 1933 Act's registration
requirements.' 6 Citing to the Capital General and Harwyn cases, the
SEC noted that, although these Internet companies did not receive value
directly from the people to whom they distributed the shares of stock,
152. See Loofbourrow, 1999 WL 514038, at *2; WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083, at *1;
WowAuction, 1999 WL 514042, at *1.
153. See Loofbourrow, 1999 WL 514038, at *2; WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083, at *1;
WowAuction, 1999 WL 514042, at *1.
154. WowAuction, 1999 WL 514042.
155. See WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083.
156. See Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040.
157. IL
158. Id.
159. See Loofbourrow, 1999 WL 514038; see also Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040.
160. See WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083, at *2.
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the value received by these companies could nonetheless be found by
looking to the entire transaction.' 61 "[A] gift of stock is a 'sale' within the
meaning of the Securities Act when the purpose of the 'gift' is to ad-
vance the donor's economic objectives rather than to make a gift for
simple reasons of generosity."' 62 The SEC then observed that in each of
these cases the companies received value in the form of the creation of a
market for their shares, and in some cases, generation of interest in their
future planned rPOs.'6
The SEC then went on to note that the issuance of stock through
these share distribution programs over the Internet also helped to pro-
vide value unique to the Internet medium, including advertising the
websites, increasing brand recognition,'64 enhancing the sales of products
on their websites,'65 and attracting people interested in investing capital
in these fledgling Internet companies.'66
Having satisfied the value element of Section 2(a)(3), the SEC next
cited the American Library Ass'n v. Pataki holding that the Internet is
"an instrument of interstate commerce," in support of the Section 5 re-
quirement that the sale or offer for sale be made utilizing a
communication in interstate commerce. 167
Finally, the SEC quickly dismissed the possibility that these share
distribution programs might qualify for an exemption under Rules 505
or 506 of Regulation D. 61 The SEC likewise dismissed the possibility of
applying the Rule 504 exemption to these programs. 69
161. Id.; see also Capital General, Release No. 34-32669, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) 85,223, at 84,417 (July 23, 1993); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F.
Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
162. WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083, at *3.
163. Id.
164. See Loofbourrow, 1999 WL 514038, at *2; Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040, at *3;
WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083, at *3.
165. See WowAuction, 1999 WL 514042, at *2.
166. See Loofbourrow, 1999 WL 514038, at *3.
167. See WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083, at *3 (citing American Library Ass'n v. Pataki,
969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). Having established that each of the free share distri-
bution programs constituted a "sale" under securities law, the respondents in both the
WebWorks and Loolbourrow cases were also cited for having violated Section 17(a) of the
1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 based upon the
fraudulent conduct in which they engaged in furtherance of said "sale." WebWorks, 1999 WL
514083, at *4; Loofbourrow, 1999 W.L 514038, at *4.
168. See WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083; see also Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-
508 (1999).
169. See WebWorks, 1999 WL 514083. The SEC also noted that effective April 7, 1999,
Rule 504 was amended to limit the circumstances under which general solicitations for offer-
ings not exceeding an aggregate annual amount of $1 million may be made, specifically: (1) if
the offering is "registered under state law requiring public filing and delivery of a disclosure
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D. An Analysis of the SEC's Cease and Desist Orders
Analyzing the reasoning provided in the SEC's Orders, one can eas-
ily discern how Harwyn and Capital General could be used to support a
finding that these Internet-based share distribution programs constituted
sales subject to the Act's registration provisions. Akin to the programs in
Harwyn, Capital General, and Datronics (hereinafter referred to as
"Harwyn and its progeny"), the SEC found that the companies had de-
signed these share distribution programs to create a market for the
sponsoring company's stock and to raise interest in future public offer-
ings by these companies.70 For example, WebWorks advised people to
"[h]old on to the shares until we take our company public. At this time
you will be free to sell your shares on the open market ...... The goal
of creating interest in future public offerings, however, is by no means
limited to the four companies targeted by the SEC. For example, in rec-
ognition of investor exuberance for IPOs, the FreeIPO.com website
encourages Internet companies "to offer free shares or cash bonus[es] to
build momentum for successful initial public offering[s] ... In the cur-
rent Internet IPO frenzy environment where Internet stocks are traded
[for] hundreds and even thousands [of] dollars per unique viewer,
FreelPO creates a win-win deal between mass viewers and the Internet
ventures."'' 2 Indeed, the very name "FreelIPO" speaks volumes as to the
company's intent.
One can also discern the analogy between the Harwyn court's analy-
sis of the "entire transaction" as a means of finding value, and the SEC's
analysis of the "entire transaction" in order to find value in these Inter-
net-based share distribution programs. In Harwyn and its progeny the
courts considered whether the distribution of shares of stock in a spin-off
corporation, without the receipt of any value from the share recipients
themselves, would constitute a sale of securities such that the distribu-
tion would be subject to the 1933 Act's registration requirements.' In
each of those cases, the courts necessarily looked to the "entire transac-
tion" in order to find value because nothing of value was provided by the
share recipients themselves.74
document to investors before sale, or (2) [if it is] exempted under state law permitting general
solicitation and advertising so long as sales are only made to accredited investors." Id. -2-3.
170. See SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Hanvyn
Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Capital General, Release No. 34-32669,
[1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,223, at 84,417 (July 23, 1993).
171. WebWorks, 1999 WL514083, at*3.
172. FreeIPO.com, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
173. See Datronics, 490 F.2d at 250; Harwyn, 326 F. Supp. at 943; Capital General,
Release No. 34-32669, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,223, at 84,417.
174. Id.
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In each of its Orders, the SEC conducted a similar analysis of the
"entire transaction" in order to find value; specifically, the SEC found
each of the programs created value for the issuing company by creating a
demand for its stock and interest in future public offerings by the com-
pany. Similar to the court's reasoning in Harwyn and its progeny, and
looking solely to these two attributes of value, neither the creation of a
public market nor the creation of a demand for company stock would
flow directly from the share recipients themselves. As such, the SEC
would necessarily have to look to the "entire transaction" in order to find
value.
Such an analysis seems strained, however, because these two attrib-
utes of value were not the only value created by these share distribution
programs. Unlike the share recipients in Harwyn and its progeny, the
SEC found the share recipients in these Internet-based share distribution
programs to have provided two additional attributes of value directly to
the companies. First, these share distribution programs encouraged peo-
ple to visit the company websites, thereby increasing the coveted web
traffic and number of unique hits. As the SEC's Director of Enforcement
Richard Walker noted, such a program is a "useful mechanism for at-
tracting traffic to a Web site and that has real value ... [i]t enhances the
product and raises credibility ..."'75 Second, these programs required
individuals to provide personal information to the companies during the
registration process, information that the companies could use to conduct
direct marketing, to attract additional advertising to their websites, and
• • 176
to sell to third party information brokers.
In light of these very significant differences, it seems unnecessary
for the SEC to take a broader view of the "entire transaction" in order to
find value because the share recipients in these cases clearly provided
something of value directly to the companies in return for the shares.
Thus, it is difficult to understand why the SEC would limit its findings
to Harwyn and its progeny, when the facts underlying these four Orders
presented much more cogent reasons for finding the value that would
qualify the programs as sales subject to the Act's registration require-
ments.
In essence, although the SEC acknowledged the value of the per-
sonal information, it did not appear to integrate this value into its
decision making process, except as almost an afterthought, choosing in-
stead to focus on the more settled "creation of a public market" as the
primary value metric. As a result, there are still a number of unresolved
175. Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Settles Four Cases Offering 'Free Stock,' N.Y. TItEs, July
23, 1999, at D2.
176. See supra Part H.
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questions regarding the use of these Internet-based share distribution
programs in the future. For example, would the provision of only a name
during the registration process, with nothing else, constitute value under
§ 2(a)(3)? Would the company offering shares of stock have to register if
it agreed not to sell or disclose the information, and not to use the infor-
mation for marketing or targeted advertising of its own, or by others?
Would it alter the analysis of value if the company did not accept adver-
tising on its website?
Even before the SEC issued these Orders, there was already confu-
sion as to how a company should view the personal information
provided by individuals while registering for these share distribution
programs. For example, even after the SEC thrice refused to issue No-
Action Letters, the May 24, 1999 letter from Jones & Rutten evidenced
their failure to appreciate what the SEC believed was the value imparted
during the registration process: "[w]e believe that our proposed offering
is fundamentally different from other proposed offerings on which the
Division has commented because none of our prospective shareholders
would be required to do anything to receive shares ... Indeed, none of
our shareholders would even be required to visit an Internet website.' 77
It seems clear from this letter that the authors did not grasp the value
inherent in the registration information itself, which, whether furnished
online or through the mail, still qualifies as value provided by the share
recipients.
Although the SEC did not place its primary focus on the unique
value of personal information provided through Internet-based share
distribution programs, the SEC clearly recognized the special value of
this information in the cyber-world. As important as registration may be
in a real-world offering, it takes on even greater significance in the con-
text of an Internet offering because of the unique questions that can arise
through ownership of securities held, not in certificate form, but rather
as cyber-shares, and as a result of the facilitation of the offering through
an impersonal, and at times anonymous, medium like the Internet.
Additionally, because of the increasing value attributed to this informa-
tion in the cyber-world, companies should apprise share registrants of
how their personal information is used, and what they are receiving in
return for parting with this highly valuable information.
Disclosure through registration would also go a long way toward an-
swering some of the questions raised by Representative Edward J.
Markey to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in a letter regarding these free
stock offers over the Internet:
177. Jones & Rutten Letters, supra note 144.
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[d]o the shareholders have common or preferred stock? Are the
shareholders owners of the company, and what is their relation-
ship to any other shareholders (i.e. insider shareholders)? Will
the shareholders receive annual reports? Do the shareholders
have voting rights? Can the shareholders replace management or
demand seats on the company's board? Can they file share-
holder resolutions at an annual shareholder meeting? 78
The SEC has already demonstrated a sensitivity to the need for bet-
ter disclosures in conjunction with securities offerings over the Internet.
Although not designed specifically in response to these share distribu-
tion programs, the SEC enacted changes to the Rule 504 exemption from
the 1933 Act's registration requirements in 1999 in order to ensure that
proper disclosure is given to potential investors, many of whom are more
commonly being solicited via the Internet. The 504 exemption of Regu-
lation D "provides an exemption from Securities Act registration for
securities offerings of non-reporting companies that do not exceed an
aggregate annual amount of $1 million."' 79 Although Regulation D gen-
erally exempts these offerings from federal securities registration
requirements, issuers must nonetheless register in each state in which
they make an offering, unless a state exemption is available.8
In 1992, when the SEC first enacted Regulation D, it placed sub-
stantial reliance on the individual states' securities laws "because the
size and local nature of these small offerings did not appear to warrant
imposing extensive federal regulation."' 8s' Where once these small 504
exempted offerings were generally confined to a small local area within
a given state, these offerings are now being made available on a nation-
wide basis with relative ease, due at least in part to the technological
innovations provided by the Internet.12 Nationwide 504 exempted of-
ferings are also being utilized more frequently in fraudulent offerings by
micro-cap companies."'
Due to concern that companies were using the 504 exemption to is-
sue securities on a nationwide basis in states without registration or
prospectus delivery requirements,' 4 facilitated in part through the
boundless reach of the Internet, the SEC amended Rule 504. Under the
178. Markey Asks SEC to Answer Questions Regarding 'Free Stock Offerings on Inter-
net,' 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) 423 (Apr. 2, 1999).
179. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 7644, [1999
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,114 at 81,769 (Feb. 25, 1999).
180. Id. at 81,770.
181. Id. at8l,771.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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amended Rule 504, issuers must register the transaction "under a state
law requiring public filing and delivery of a disclosure document before
sale."' s5 For a sale to occur in a state without this sort of provision, the
issuer must register the transaction in another state with such a provi-
sion, and must deliver a disclosure document filed in that state to all
purchasers before sale in both states may occur.l16 In light of the value
of the personal information provided during the website registration
process, the SEC's concern about adequate disclosure would appear to
be equally applicable to Internet-based share distribution programs. In
504 exempted offerings, as well as Internet-based share distribution pro-
grams, compliance with the 1933 Act's registration requirements is
consistent with one of the Act's primary concerns, namely to protect
investors by ensuring that they have adequate information to make logi-
cal and fully informed investment decisions.
E. Internet-Based Share Distribution Programs Revisited
1. Share Distributions in Exchange for Registration or Referrals
Utilizing the reasoning set forth in the SEC's July 21, 1999 Orders
as guidance, we can now revisit the share distribution programs dis-
cussed in Part I.
First, it would appear that any program that promises to distribute
shares of stock in return for the provision of personal information con-
stitutes a sale under Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, and must comply
with the Act's registration requirements.87 As such, YouNetwork prop-
erly registered its share distribution program wherein it offered to
distribute 1,000,000 shares of Class A stock to individuals who regis-
tered on its website.
YouNetwork's rebate program, whereby YouNetwork converts re-
bate points, earned through product purchases, into Class B common
stock, would also appear to be a sale that would require registration un-
der the 1933 Act. By way of analogy, in the WebWorks case the
company offered to distribute shares of stock to individuals in return for
both subscribing to the Telco long-distance phone service, as well as for
185. Id. at 81,774 (emphasis added). The other option for securing a 504 exemption un-
der amended Rule 504 would require issuance of securities under a state law that permits
general solicitations so long as sales are only made to "accredited investors," as defined in
Regulation D. Id.
186. Id.
187. It is important to note that YouNetwork did in fact register to issue its free shares.
See YouNetwork, supra note 11.
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remaining a subscriber for a pre-specified period of months.8 Citing
Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, the SEC noted that "'[a]ny security
given or delivered with, or as a bonus on account of, any purchase of...
any other things, shall be conclusively presumed to constitute a part of
the subject of such purchase and to have been offered and sold for
value."" 89 Similarly, YouNetwork's distribution of rebates in return for
purchasing products, rebates which YouNetwork will convert to Class B
common stock, could likewise be deemed a distribution of securities as a
bonus for making a purchase. As the SEC held in its WebWorks Order,
-such a program would constitute a sale that would fall within the ambit
of the 1933 Act's registration requirements.
2. Contingent Share Distribution Programs
With regard to the Internet sites that offer various contingent inter-
ests in shares of stock, the SEC's value analysis is likewise instructive.
Altogether, there were four websites discussed above that offered
registrants some type of contingent interest in the soliciting companies.
Popular Link solicits personal information, but cautions registrants that
"[a]ll shares and cash bonus numbers are reservation numbers, and will
be paid or converted to actual issued stock numbers after Popular Link
successfully files with [the] SEC for [an] IPO (initial public offering).'
Similarly, Lifestyle discloses on its website that "we are allowing
you to register for our weekly Travel e-zine on this site and receive 50
free shares of stock upon the commencement of an IPO. You will be no-
tified by E-mail on how to receive the actual shares of stock."'9'
Lifestyle's free share offer is somewhat confusing, however, because
while the foregoing statement appears to offer individuals 50free shares
of stock in return for registering with the website, a footnote on the Life-
style website appears instead to refer to this plan as providing up to 50
options on shares.' 92 Moreover, according to this footnote, these options
would not be free, but would instead be exercisable at some future date,
in return for money: "[t]he exercise price for the stock options is as of
yet undetermined, however, the range should be between $0.40 and
$1.00 per option.' 93 Regardless of which plan Lifestyle actually offers,
188. See WebWorks, 1999 WL514083, at*3.
189. Id.
190. Popular Link, supra note 17 (emphasis added).
191. Lifestyle, supra note 23 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at n.3. Also confusing is the notation in the footnote that Lifestyle is distributing
these shares not merely for registering with the website, but for recruiting others to join the
program. It is therefore unclear how a registrant actually receives these shares of stock, and
what the registrant is receiving.
193. Id.
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for purposes of this discussion of contingent share distribution programs
we will presume that the program involves either the provision of shares
of stock, contingent on the company holding an IPO, or the provision of
stock options that will vest if and when the company goes public.
In a slight variation on the first two programs, Himmel Technol-
ogy's Tradehall website discloses that "it is contemplating rewarding its
registered members with equity shares in the company free of charge if
and when it becomes a public entity."''1 4 Finally, MyGo offers what it
terms 4 free shares of stock to individuals who sign up on its website,
and an additional 1000 free shares of stock to each of the top 300 mem-
bers who refer new members to its website."' Further down on the web
page, however, MyGo discloses that it is not actually an incorporated
entity, so that, although individuals are allegedly given free shares of
stock upon registering with the website, people apparently need to wait
until MyGo completes the incorporation process in order to gain their
"ownership interest" in the stock.'96 Thus, MyGo appears to offer contin-
gent shares of stock in its company, contingent upon it becoming
incorporated.
Although the exact description of the interests distributed through
each of these programs varies, each involves the distribution of some-
thing less than an actual share of stock. The question then becomes
whether these share distribution programs are subject to the 1933 Act's
registration requirements, because each company appears to sell, at best,
only a contingent interest in their securities in return for the provision of
personal information.
In Rubin v. U.S.,' 97 the United States Supreme Court analyzed the
application of Section 2(a)(3) of the 1933 Act to a securities transaction
that involved the "disposition" of a security, although not the actual sale
of the security. Specifically, Rubin involved the appeal of a corporate
vice-president indicted on three counts of violating, and conspiracy to
violate, various federal anti-fraud statutes, including Section 17(a) of the
1933 Act, which prohibits the use of fraud in the offer or sale of securi-
ties.' 9 One of the primary questions raised on appeal was whether the
pledge of stock as collateral for a loan constituted an "offer or sale" of
that stock, such that the Act's anti-fraud provisions applied, when the
stock itself was represented as good, marketable and unrestricted, but
194. Tradehall, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
195. See MyGo, supra note 26.
196. Id.
197. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
198. Id. at425-27.
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was in fact restricted, nonmarketable and practically worthless.199 In or-
der to answer this question, the Court necessarily analyzed Section
2(a)(3) of the Act and concluded that "a pledge of shares of stock un-
mistakably involves a 'disposition of [an] interest in a security, for
value.' Although pledges transfer less than absolute title, the interest
thus transferred nonetheless is an 'interest in a security."' 2' Further
clarifying its position, the Court went on to note that "[i]t is not essential
under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the trans-
action to be an 'offer' or a 'sale."' 201 The Court also observed that
"[t]reating pledges as included among 'offers' and 'sales' comports with
the purpose of the Act," which is to promote the disclosure of informa-
tion and to prevent fraud.20 Expanding upon this theory, the Court also
observed that:
[t]he economic considerations and realities present when a
lender parts with value and accepts securities as collateral secu-
rity for a loan are similar in [an] important respect to the risk an
investor undertakes when purchasing shares. Both are relying on
the value of the securities themselves .... regardless of whether
the transferor passes full title or only a conditional and defeasi-
ble interest.. 203
Although no temporal propinquity exists between Rubin and these
Internet-based share distribution programs, this test for reliance easily
extends to contingent share distribution programs, because they each
involve the provision of valuable personal information by the website
registrant in reliance upon the potential worth of the shares of stock be-
ing distributed.2 Indeed, the companies themselves go to great lengths
on their websites to tout the potential value of their stock and to play off
of the "Internet IPO Frenzy. 2 5 Even if a company promises a website
registrant only a conditional receipt of shares, such as a reservation
number for the receipt of shares if and when the company goes public,
199. Id. at 428.
200. Id. at 429.
201. Id. at 430.
202. Id. at 43 1.
203. 1& (emphasis added).
204. See supra Part II for a detailed discussion of the "value" of this personal informa-
tion.
205. See, e.g., WebWorks, supra note 5 ("Assuming you received the full 63 shares, the
total net asset value of your shares (on paper), will be approximately $2,419.20 in theory");
WowAuction, supra note 7 ("In related [I]ntemet auction news, City Auction was acquirea by
Ticketmaster in late February for... approx. $54 million... Moreover, eNet recently bought
Auctiongate for $5.8 million... And at the market close on March 8, 1999, eBay's total stock
worth was over $20 billion! !").
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that person can be said to have parted with value in expectation of, and
reliance upon, the value touted by the company.
At the very least, these contingent share distribution programs en-
gender the "disposition of a security." Like Rubin, the disposition is
complete at the time the buyer (in this case the registering member) pro-
vides the personal information, and the seller (in this case the Internet
company) provides the buyer with reservation numbers, or some other
means of evidencing the potential shares of stock.2 The risk that the
contingent interest may never result in the actual provision of the shares,
if for example the company does not hold an IPO, does not alter the fact
that a disposition has occurred, thus invoking the registration and disclo-
sure provisions of the 1933 Act.207
In Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc., the Seventh Circuit
likewise examined the types of contingent securities transactions that
might fall within the 1933 Act's definition of an offer or sale of securi-
ties. 203 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit considered whether entry into a
Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA") forward con-
tract constitutes the purchase and sale of the underlying GNMA security,
such that the transaction would be subject to the anti-fraud provisions of
the 1933 Act, even though the GNMA forward contract itself is not a
security as defined by the Act.29 Plaintiff Abrams entered the forward
contract in dispute on February 6, 1981, with the settlement date set for
May 20, 1981. Despite the fact that plaintiff made an initial "good faith"
deposit on the contract of $19,200, defendant Oppenheimer made a re-
quest for an additional deposit from plaintiff in April 1981, allegedly to
cover a decrease in the market value of the underlying GNMA securi-
ties.10 Plaintiff refused to pay this money, alleging that the contract's
settlement date was set for May 20, 1981, and further alleging that the
defendant had made material misrepresentations during the sale of the
contract.21' As a result of plaintiff's refusal to pay the deposit, defendant
sold plaintiff's contract at the prevailing market price, and returned only
206. See, e.g., Rubin, 449 U.S. at 429-30.
207. See Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 559, nA. (2nd Cir.
1985) ("We perceive no reason why a contingency attached to a contractual right to acquire
stock should remove that right from securities lav coverage simply because it increases the
risk that plaintiff will not obtain the shares.").
208. 737 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1984).
209. Id. at 583.
210. Id. at 584.
211. Id.
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$1,700 of the initial good faith deposit to plaintiff.2 2 Plaintiff thereafter
commenced an action to recover the remaining $17,500 of his deposit.
213
In order to consider the allegations of fraud, the court first assessed
whether the sale of a forward contact constitutes the sale of a security as
defined by the 1933 Act. To answer this question, the court first looked
to the Act's definition of the term sale, which includes "every contract of
sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value., 2 14
The court then went on to note that "[i]t is well established that a con-
tract to purchase and sell securities constitutes a purchase or sale of the
securities for the purpose of the securities laws. '21 5 In analyzing the
GNMA forward contract, the court held that neither the delay in the ac-
tual delivery of the securities, nor the fact that the contract pertained to
"when issued" securities that had not yet been issued, would "deny the
existence of the contract for the purchase and sale of the securities. 216 In
support of this holding, the court explained that the terms of the GNMA
forward contract had a "sufficient nexus" to the underlying securities to
be characterized as a contract to "purchase," "acquire," "sell" or
"otherwise dispose of' securities.2 7 Specifically, the contract obligated
the plaintiff to take delivery of the GNMA security on the settlement
date, and entitled the purchaser to payment of principal and interest on
the 15th of each month following settlement. 2 '8 The contract was thus "a
firm commitment to take delivery, as opposed to a GNMA standby
commitment which gives the seller the right to deliver to the buyer only
if the seller so desires. 2 9 It therefore appears that one of the keys to as-
sessing whether a contract to sell securities in the future constitutes a
sale under the 1933 Act is whether there is a "firm commitment," where
both the buyer and seller are locked in to the transaction, even though
the securities themselves are not exchanged at that time, and indeed,
may not yet have even been issued.
In light of the foregoing, it would appear that many of the contingent
share distribution programs discussed above constitute sales under the
1933 Act, although they distribute only contingent interests, as long as
they involve a contractually firm commitment to dispose of the securities
at some future date. For example, Popular Link's provision of reserva-
tion numbers for shares of stock, numbers that it will allegedly convert
212. Id. at 585.
213. Id.
214. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(3) (1997) (emphasis added).
215. Abrams, 737 F.2d at 587 (emphasis added).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 587-88.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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to issued stock after a successful IPO, could be characterized as a con-
tract to "purchase," "acquire," "sell" or "otherwise dispose of'
securities. As the Abrams court reasoned, a contract to purchase and sell
securities in the future can constitute a purchase or sale of the underlying
security, and neither a delay in the actual delivery of the security nor the
fact that the contract pertains to "when issued" securities, will remove
the transaction from within the parameters of a sale.220 Additionally, the
fact that the interest transferred may be only a conditional and defeasible
interest, and that there is a risk the contingency might never come to
fruition, will not alter this analysis.2'
Turning to the assessment of whether these contingent share distri-
bution programs constitute contracts, such that they would evidence a
firm commitment by both parties to the transaction, we must revisit basic
contract law. Generally, in order for a contract to be legally binding
there must be consideration, meeting of the minds, and mutuality of ob-
ligation. 2 Based upon the value of the personal information provided by
a website registrant, the furnishing of this information could be deemed
the visitor's consideration for the contract.2 3 Similarly, by providing a
website registrant with a contingent interest in shares of stock, an Inter-
net company likewise provides consideration, thereby establishing the
requisite mutuality of obligation. "Where the requirement of considera-
tion is at issue ... contract law has traditionally settled for the most
insignificant of performances as a sufficient 'detriment'-a hawk, a
horse, a robe, a peppercorn." 2 4 Finally, because a company only requests
the personal information after providing a registrant with an explicit de-
scription of the share distribution program and a description of the
contingent share interest which she would receive, there can be said to
be a meeting of the minds. Thus, a contract for a contingent interest in
securities, such as the distribution of reservation numbers for shares of
stock, constitutes a contract for the disposition or sale of those securities,
which must be registered pursuant to the Act. Popular Link's apparent
attempt to circumvent the requisite registration process by offering reg-
istrants "reservation numbers" as opposed to shares of stock would
therefore appear to be unavailing.
Similarly, Lifestyle's share distribution program would also appear
to fall within the ambit of the 1933 Act's registration requirements.
220. l at 587.
221. See Rubin, 449 U.S. at 431; see also Yoder, 751 F.2d at 559, n.4.
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3.
223. See supra Part II, for a detailed discussion of the "value" of this personal informa-
tion.
224. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 1.6 (2d ed. 1990).
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Lifestyle in no way qualifies its offer to issue shares of stock to website
registrants "upon the commencement of an IPO," and even promises that
it will notify these registrants by E-mail on how to receive the actual
shares of stock once the company goes public.2 Therefore, once the
registrant provides the personal information requested by the website,
the contract is fully executed, and a firm commitment is established.
If, instead of distributing contingent shares of stock, however, Life-
style were distributing stock options, as alluded to in footnote 3 on
Lifestyle's website, the analysis would likely be different. Unlike the
promotion in Popular Link, where the disposition of the security is com-
plete once the member provides the personal information and the
company issues the reservation numbers, the provision of an option
would mean that the disposition of securities would not actually take
place until some future date, if at all, at which time the member would
be given the right to exercise the option and convert it into stock at the
exercise price. In fact, the 1933 Act specifically exempts stock options
from its definition of a sale:
[t]he issue or transfer of a right or privilege, when originally is-
sued or transferred with a security' giving the holder of such
security the right to convert such security into another security
of the same issuer or of another person, or giving a right to sub-
scribe to another security of the same issuer or of another
person, which right cannot be exercised until some future date,
shall not be deemed to be an offer or sale of such other secu-
rity. 2
6
It would therefore appear that the provision of an option for securi-
ties would fall outside of the Act's definition of a sale, and a website
utilizing such a distribution program may not need to register the pro-
gram with the SEC.
Application of the registration requirements to Tradehall's share
distribution program on the other hand, raises a completely different is-
sue. Unlike the Popular Link and Lifestyle programs, Tradehall does not
promise to give away free shares at any time, even if the company does
go public. Instead, Tradehall's offer makes it clear that it is only
"contemplating" giving away free shares. As the Abrams court noted, the
key to assessing whether a contract to purchase securities which are to
be issued in the future constitutes a sale of those securities under the
1933 Act is whether there is a "firm commitment" where both the buyer
225. See Lifestyle, supra note 23.
226. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(3) (1997).
Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth
and seller are locked in to the transaction 227 Because the Tradehall
website clearly qualifies its offer with the use of the word
"contemplating," making the provision of shares optional, it could be
argued that this obviates the possibility of establishing a firm offer to
sell securities. Because Tradehall does not guarantee the receipt of
shares at some future date, Tradehall's offer arguably falls outside the
scope of a disposition or sale of securities, and as such would not have to
be registered under the 1933 Act.
Finally, applying the Rubin and Abrams analysis to MyGo's share
distribution program, in conjunction with the SEC's holding in Sotirakis,
it becomes clear that even MyGo's contingent share distribution pro-
gram would be subject to the 1933 Act's registration requirements.2n As
the SEC held in Sotirakis, the fact that an unincorporated entity issues
shares of stock does not affect the analysis of whether the distribution
constitutes a sale under the 1933 Act.29 Quoting Yoder v. Orthomolecu-
lar Nutrition Inst., Inc., the SEC ruled that a "[s]ale of Kinesis stock
occurred even though Kinesis stock certificates did not exist and were
not delivered," because a sale of stock may occur under the securities
law even if the contract is never fully performed*20 The fact that MyGo
is an unincorporated entity would not appear to affect whether MyGo's
program is adjudicated to be a sale of stock. The only question to be an-
swered, therefore, would be whether the contingent interest distributed
by MyGo qualifies as a firm commitment, such that a disposition of that
stock occurs at the time an individual signs up on the MyGo website.
Again utilizing the reliance test from Rubin, it is clear that individu-
als provide their registration information to MyGo in reliance upon, and
with the expectation of, receiving shares of stock. The fact that MyGo's
website boasts that "MyGo is giving away free shares of its stock" and a
user can "[blecome a co-owner today and own a piece of [her] favorite
portal" clearly raises an expectation upon which the registrant could
rely.2' In contrast to the Tradehall offer, the fact that MyGo in no way
qualifies its provision of a potential "ownership interest" in its stock
upon its incorporation leads to the conclusion that MyGo is making a
firm commitment to distribute the stock once it incorporates. Thus, the
contract is fully executed, and MyGo's obligation to distribute the stock
fully vests, the moment a new member provides personal information to
227. See Abrams, 737 F.2d at 582.
228. See Rubin, 449 U.S. at 424; Abrams, supra note 227, at 582; Sotirakis, 1999 WL
514040, at *2.
229. See Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040, at *2.
230. Id.
23 1. MyGo, supra note 26 (emphasis added).
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the company during the share registration process. This analysis seems
to apply equally to MyGo's situation, even though MyGo has not yet
incorporated or issued shares.232
3. Share Distribution Through Contests
The distribution of stock through a contest or drawing, such as
ExitNorth's program, can most closely be analogized to the facts in
Matter of Sotirakis.233 Despite the fact that the company in which Mr.
Sotirakis was offering shares of stock was never incorporated, the SEC
nonetheless found that securing personal registration information in re-
turn for the promise of receiving the company's stock qualified as an
offer for sale under the 1933 Act. Quoting the Second Circuit's decision
in Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 2 the SEC noted that
"[a] contract for the issuance or transfer of a security may qualify as a
sale under the securities laws even if the contract is never fully per-
formed. 235 In the Sotirakis case, the company could not actually fulfill
the contract because it was not a legal corporate entity capable of issuing
stock.
Likewise, whenever a company distributes stock through a contest,
such as ExitNorth's offer to provide stock to ten lucky winners,2 6 there
is always a risk that the company might not fully perform the contract as
to any individual entrant, because only a pre-specified number of en-
trants will eventually win the stock, while all of the other contest
entrants will, by the terms of the contest, not receive any shares of stock.
But, as the Yoder court noted in a footnote, there is "no reason why a
contingency attached to a contractual right to acquire stock should re-
move that right from securities law coverage simply because it increases
the risk that plaintiff will not obtain the shares. '237 The Seventh Circuit's
holding in Abrams further bolsters this proposition, having held that a
contract to sell or dispose of a security or interest in a security, for value,
is subject to the securities laws, even if the contract is not yet performed,
and even if the contract pertains to "when issued" securities.2 3 ' Shares of
232. See Abrams, 737 F.2d at 589; Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040.
233. See Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040.
234. 751 F.2d at 559.
235. Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040, at *2.
236. See ExitNorth, supra note 14, at 6.
237. Yoder, 751 F.2d at 559, n.4.
238. See Abrams, 737 F.2d at 587. Although Abrams dealt with a contract that would be
executed in the future, a contract that locked in both the buyer and the seller, the court's
holding is still applicable to share distribution contests. Even though only a certain number of
contest entrants will receive the shares, each and every person enters the contest pursuant to
the terms laid out on the website, and thus each and every entrant enters into a contract with
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stock distributed through contests would therefore appear to qualify as
sales under the securities law and would need to be registered pursuant
to the 1933 Act's registration requirements. The registration requirement
holds true even though a company may not distribute the shares at the
time an individual registers for the program, and even though only a few
of the program registrants actually will receive the stock2 9
4. A New Method for Distributing Stock
Taking a completely different approach to its distribution of shares
of stock, MyOwnEmpire offers to distribute a single share of stock to
each visitor that registers on its website and then makes MyOwnEm-
pire's website her start page and visits the site at least 10 days out of
every 30 days for a 90-day period.240 In essence, MyOwnEmpire appears
to be avoiding the emphasis of the program on the registration process
by instead conditioning the share distribution on a member's utilization
of its website.24' It is clear that a firm commitment to distribute My-
OwnEmpire's stock does not arise at the time that a newly registered
member provides the personal information, because a person would not
qualify for the stock for at least 90 days after registration. Additionally,
because a registering individual could fail to visit the MyOwnEmpire
website the requisite number of times, and thus never qualify for the
stock, that individual cannot rely upon the expectation of receiving stock
at the time of registration.
Does that mean that MyOwnEmpire's share distribution program
does not qualify as a sale or disposition of securities such that it would
be exempted from the 1933 Act's registration requirements? Probably
not. Just because the sale or disposition of the securities does not take
place at the time the personal information is provided, does not obviate
the possibility that a sale or disposition of the securities occurs at a later
point in time. Recall that there is also value in having individuals visit a
website numerous times, because these visits not only offer a company
additional opportunities to sell its products or services, but they also
raise the company's web hit statistics, which can in turn increase the
company's advertising revenue.242 In essence, every time an individual
visits the website, she provides value to the site. Once the individual
the website providing personal information upon the understanding that they will be entered
into a drawing, the winners of which will receive the shares of stock.
239. For a discussion of other laws that may apply to contests for free share distribu-
tions, see Part IV.
240. See MyOwnEmpire, supra note 29.
241. Il MyOwnEmpire believes its method of share distributions to be so unique that it
has apparently filed for a patent on its consumer-owner business model.
242. See Wyatt, supra note 175.
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visits the site the requisite number of times, her right to shares vests, and
it is at that time that a disposition and sale of the shares takes place.
Thus, although MyOwnEmpire's program prevents the provision of per-
sonal information from giving rise to a sale as defined by Section 2(a)(3)
of the 1933 Act, the member's subsequent visits to the website can
nonetheless provide the value necessary for the program to be a sale un-
der the Act. The structure of MyOwnEmpire's program merely delays,
but does not obviate, the sale of securities that would give rise to the
registration requirements under the 1933 Act.4
IV. STATE LAWS POTENTIALLY IMPLICATED BY INTERNET-BASED
SHARE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS
A. State Pyramid and Chain Distribution Statutes
As discussed in Part I, many Internet-based share distribution pro-
grams offer registered members the opportunity to accrue additional
shares of stock in return for referring others to the websites who them-
selves become members (hereinafter "referral programs"). 244 Although
these referral programs may seem innocuous on the surface, in light of
the value of the personal information supplied by visitors during the
registration process, these referral programs could be viewed as illegal
chain distribution or pyramid schemes (collectively "pyramid schemes")
under various state laws.245
Virtually every state in the United States outlaws pyramid schemes,
which are schemes involving the payment of something of value in ex-
change for the opportunity to receive compensation for recruiting new
members into the scheme.2" In pyramid schemes, the primary focus is on
recruiting others into the scheme in return for "headhunting fees. ' 47 In
contrast, legal multi-level marketing programs focus on the actual sale of
goods to consumers through independent sales people who sell directly
243. On its website, MyOwnEmpire claims to be exempt from the federal registration
requirements based upon its alleged qualification for a Rule 504, Regulation D exemption
under federal law, and a state exemption under California Corporation Code Section
25113(b)(I). See MyOwnEmpire, supra note 29. As the goal of this article is to assess the
application of the federal registration requirements to various share distribution programs, this
article will not address whether, having qualified as sale of stock under the 1933 Act, the
company may nonetheless skirt the registration requirements by claiming an exemption.
244. See, e.g., Travelzoo, supra note 1; Popular Link, supra note 17.
245. See supra Part II, for a more detailed discussion of the "value" of this personal in-
formation.
246. See In re Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618, 667 (1979).
247. Id.
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to consumers on a commission basis."' These sales channels are known
as "multi-level" because they have a number of levels of supervision,
generally comprised of "independent distributors acting as wholesalers
as well as retailers." 249
The primary distinction between the two programs is that in a pyra-
mid scheme the focus is primarily on recruiting new individuals until the
well of new recruits dries up, at which time many of the scheme's par-
ticipants lose their investments. In contrast, while referrals help to
enhance the distribution channels in multi-level marketing programs, the
focus is nonetheless on the sale of actual consumable products, not on
the headhunting. Additionally, although pyramid schemes always in-
volve the payment of something of value in order to enroll in the
scheme, multi-level marketing programs generally do not charge for the
right to enroll in the program.
Because both pyramid schemes and multi-level marketing programs
involve the use of referrals, we need to scrutinize these web-based refer-
ral programs in order to determine into which category they fall.
Generally, one may differentiate between pyramids and multi-level mar-
keting programs by focusing on two primary questions: 1) whether the
purpose of the program is to sell products or merely recruit additional
individuals into a chain; and 2) whether the recruits are required to pro-
vide something of value in order to enroll in the program.2'0 Although a
number of the Internet companies operating referral programs actually
sell merchandise on their websites, the referral programs themselves
generally do not involve the sale of any goods, but instead require only
that registered members refer people to their websites. For example,
Bonus Blvd. discloses that:
[w]e will also distribute 1,000,000 Class A shares to members
based upon their referrals of new members to our web site. Each
time a new member lists an existing member as the referring
party in the new member's registration at our web site, we will
distribute one share to the referring member.5
Because the only requirement for receiving shares of stock through
Bonus Blvd.'s referral program is to have a newly referred member list a
referring member as the referring party, there can be no question that the
main focus of the program is on headhunting. Thus, the primary question
248. Id. at 670.
249. Id. at 670-72.
250. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAWv § 359-ff (McKinney 1996); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 598.100(3) (1999).
251. BonusBoulevard, supra note 76, at 42.
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then becomes whether registrants who enroll in this program are pro-
viding anything of "value." Just as the application of the 1933 Act's
registration requirements hinged on the SEC's definition of "value," the
application of many state pyramid statutes likewise turns on the consid-
eration, or value provided by the referrer and her references.
For example, Nevada's Revised Statutes defines a pyramid promo-
tional scheme as:
[a] program or plan for the disposal or distribution of property
and merchandise or property or merchandise by which a partici-
pant gives or pays a valuable consideration for the opportunity
or chance to receive any compensation or thing of value in re-
turn for procuring or obtaining one or more additional persons to
participate in the program, or for the opportunity to receive
compensation of any kind when a person introduced to the pro-
gram or plan by the participant procures or obtains a new
252participant in such a program.
In order to qualify as a pyramid program in Nevada, the program
must satisfy four elements: 1) the program must involve the distribution
of property or merchandise; 2) a participant must pay a "valuable con-
sideration" to enroll in the program; 3) a participant must recruit one or
more persons who also enroll in the program; and 4) the participant must
receive "compensation or [a] thing of value" in return for her recruiting
efforts.
Inasmuch as these Internet companies design their referral programs
to distribute shares of company stock, these programs could be classified
as programs for the distribution of property, thereby satisfying the first
prong of this test. The examination next turns to whether a person is re-
quired to pay a "valuable consideration" in order to secure the
opportunity to recruit others.
Recall that these Internet companies generally condition the receipt
of shares of stock upon an individual's visit to, and registration with a
website-at which time she is asked to provide personal information. 2 3
Having registered with the website, the company then permits her to,
and indeed encourages her to, refer other people to the website, in return
for receiving additional shares of stock in the company. 2 4 As the SEC
observed in its Orders, a person visiting these websites and registering
for shares of stock in these Internet companies does indeed provide
252. NEv. REv. STAT. § 598.100(3) (1999).
253. See supra Part .
254. Id.
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"something of value" in order to enroll in the program z5 The question
then becomes whether, in light of Nevada's failure to define "valuable
consideration," the value that the SEC attributed to this personal infor-
mation constitutes "valuable consideration" under Nevada law.
As the SEC reasoned in its Orders, these Internet-based share distri-
bution programs, which would include referral programs, provide value
to Internet companies by increasing brand recognition, advertising the
websites, enhancing the sales of products on the websites and attracting
people interested in investing capital in these fledgling Internet compa-
nies.26 One could therefore argue that the benefits provided by share
recipients constitutes valuable consideration that would satisfy Nevada's
pyramid statute.
Even if the benefits noted by the SEC are considered too tenuous to
satisfy Nevada's "valuable consideration' requisite, the personal infor-
mation provided by registrants might nonetheless constitute valuable
consideration. z7 Specifically, this personal information could be deemed
valuable consideration based upon its potential use by companies either
to market products to their own members, or to sell to third party infor-
mation brokers.23 For example, Bonus Blvd. discloses in its SEC filing
that "[w]e may in the future use for our own purposes or sell to third
parties compiled information including in many instances personal in-
formation obtained from our members upon their authorization." '
Similarly, YouNetwork discloses in its SEC filing that:
[w]e expect to gather a significant base of information about our
Members through registration information, responses to closed
end beta tests and purchasing information obtained from third
parties ... [w]e intend to use this growing database to target of-
fers, increase our range of product offerings and encourage
future transactions and involvement with the YouNetwork site.6
Further bolstering the attribution of legal value to this personal in-
formation is U.S. West's assertion that the information collected about
its subscribers, which it refers to as CPNI, constitutes "valuable
255. See Loofbourrow, 1999 WL 514038; Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040; WeblVorky, 1999
WL 514083; WowAuction, 1999 WL 514042.
256. See Loofbourrow, 1999 WL 514038; Sotirakis, 1999 WL 514040; WebWorks, 1999
WL 514083; WowAuction, 1999 WL 514042.
257. Cf supra text accompanying notes 68-74 (discussing Toysmart's proposed sale of
personal information).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 162-166.
259. BonusBoulevard, supra note 76, at 31.
260. See YouNetwork, supra note 11, at 25.
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property" worthy of Fifth Amendment protection 6 ' Similarly, Toys-
mart's attempt to sell its database of customers' personal information as
a means of paying off creditors, as well as the amounts of the bids
placed for that information by potential buyers, further illustrates the
value of this information. 22 One could therefore objectively conclude,
based upon the value attributed to this personal information by the very
companies against whom these laws might be enforced, that this per-
sonal information constitutes "valuable consideration" under Nevada's
pyramid statute.
263
The third element of Nevada's pyramid statute requires that the
newly recruited individual also enroll as a participant in the program.2 4
Because a newly recruited individual can only receive shares of stock
after registering with the website herself, she too can be said to have be-
come a participant in the program.
Finally, Nevada's pyramid statute requires that the person who pays
a valuable consideration and recruits others, receive "compensation or
[a] thing of value" in return for the recruitment activities. In the context
of these Internet referral programs, the thing of value would be addi-
tional shares of company stock, which a company awards only after the
new recruit lists the referring member as the person who referred her to
the website. Because the definition of "compensation or [a] thing of
value" does not specify a minimum value, as long as the shares of stock
are redeemable for some amount of par value, regardless of how de
minimus that might be, it follows that the shares of stock would be a
"thing of value." For example, Bonus Blvd. declares its Class A stock to
have a par value of $.0001 per share.265 Thus, since all stock presumably
has some par value, distribution of this stock through a referral program
would satisfy the final element of Nevada's pyramid statute.
The potential for infracting a state's pyramid prohibitions through
the operation of an Internet referral program is by no means limited
solely to Nevada. For example, these Internet referral programs could
also be viewed as violative of Illinois' prohibition of pyramid schemes.
Pursuant to the Illinois Criminal Code, a pyramid sales scheme:
means any plan or operation whereby a person, in exchange for
money or other thing of value, acquires the opportunity to re-
ceive a benefit or thing of value, which is primarily based upon
261. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1230.
262. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 68-74 (discussing Toysmart's proposed sale of
personal information).
263. See supra Part I.
264. NEV. REv. STAT. § 598.100(3) (1999).
265. See BonusBoulevard, supra note 76, at 4.
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the inducement of additional persons, by himself or others, re-
gardless of number, to participate in the same plan or operation
and is not primarily contingent on the volume or quantity of
goods, services, or other property sold or distributed or to be
sold or distributed to person's for purposes of resale to
consumers.266
Under Illinois law, "[a]ny person who knowingly sells, offers to sell,
or attempts to sell the right to participate in a pyramid sales scheme
commits a Class A Misdemeanor." '267
In order to qualify as a pyramid scheme under Illinois' statute, the
program must: 1) require that a participant pay "money or other thing of
value"; 2) in return for the opportunity to receive "a benefit or thing of
value"; 3) "which is primarily based upon the inducement of additional
persons" to participate in the same plan or operation; and 4) which "is
not primarily contingent on the volume or quantity of goods, services, or
other property sold or distributed or to be sold or distributed to person's
for purposes of resale to consumers."
Akin to Nevada's requirement that a person pay a "valuable consid-
eration," a "thing of value" under Illinois' law could likewise be found
in the provision of personal information during the registration proc-
ess."'6 In fact, as the Illinois Appellate Division ruled in People of the
State of Ill. v. Knop, "the phrase 'thing of value' includes more than a
monetary fee. The language is not limited to the payment of money or a
tangible equivalent." 69 Citing to an analogous statute construed by the
Missouri Court of Appeals, the Illinois Court noted that consideration
should be interpreted broadly, and can even "include[] the responsibility
that a marketer assumes toward the organization and its marketing poli-
cies.,27°
A company may satisfy the second prong of Illinois' statute, which
requires that an individual be given the opportunity to receive a "benefit
or thing of value," by providing shares of stock in return for recruiting
others. The fact that the company expressly provides these additional
shares of stock as compensation for soliciting the referral satisfies the
third prong of Illinois' pyramid statute, which calls for a person to re-
ceive the thing of value in return for inducing the recruitment. Finally,
266. 720 ILL. Con,. STAT. ANN. 5/17-7(a) (vest 1993).
267. 720 ILL. CoIP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-7(a) (vest 1993).
268. See supra Part I, for a more detailed discussion of the "value" of this personal in-
formation.
269. 619 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (quoting State ex. rel. Webster v. Mem-
bership Marketing, Inc., 766 S.W.2d 654,658 (Mo. CL App. 1989)).
270. id.
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because the referral programs operated by these websites generally do
not involve the sale of any goods or products, the exception encom-
passed within the fourth prong of Illinois' pyramid statute clearly would
not apply.
In essence, what this analysis demonstrates is that by focusing their
referral programs on recruitment, in light of the increasing value attrib-
uted to personal information provided online, many Internet-based share
distribution programs could unintentionally infringe upon state pyramid
prohibitions.
B. State Gambling Laws
As an alternative means of promoting traffic to their websites and
securing valuable personal information, some Internet companies have
integrated contests into their share distribution programs (hereinafter
referred to as "share distribution contests"). For example, ExitNorth of-
fered one hundred thousand shares of its "pre-IPO stock," which was to
be "split between 10 lucky winners." 2' Other Internet companies host
contests and drawings for shares of stock as a supplement to their pri-
mary share distribution programs. 72
Proceeding again from the presumption that traveling to a com-
pany's website and providing personal information constitutes the
provision of legally significant value, one could classify these contests
as lotteries or sweepstakes, which are strictly regulated by state gam-
bling statutes. In apparent recognition of this fact, Bonus Blvd. cautions
potential investors that "the sweepstakes industry is subject to extensive
regulation on the local, state and federal levels. This regulation applies
whether sweepstakes are promoted over the Internet, through the mail or
otherwise ... Regulations governing the conduct of sweepstakes vary
from state to state and from country to country." 27' Analyzing these share
'distribution contests in light of various state gambling statutes once
again reveals that these programs might violate various state statutory
prohibitions.
For example, New York State's Constitution prohibits "the sale of
lottery tickets, pool-selling, bookmaking, or any other kind of gambling
[within the State], except lotteries operated by the State and the sale of
lottery tickets in connection therewith as may be authorized and pre-
scribed by the legislature ... ,,274 In order to enforce this prohibition, the
271. See ExitNorth, supra note 14, at 6.
272. See, e.g., BonusBoulevard, supra note 76, at 26.
273. l at 15.
274. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (amended 1985).
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New York State legislature enacted Article 225 of the Penal Law, pro-
hibiting "unlawful gambling activity," defined as any gambling activity
that is not explicitly authorized by the State of New York.27 Accord-
ingly, should an Internet company's share distribution contest qualify as
a lottery under New York State law, the contest could presumably be
viewed as "unauthorized gambling activity" in New York.
As defined in New York Penal Law Section 225.00(10):
[llottery means an unlawful gambling scheme in which (a) the
players pay or agree to pay something of value for chances, rep-
resented and differentiated by numbers or by combinations of
numbers or by some other media, one or more of which chances
are to be designated the winning ones; and (b) the winning
chances are to be determined by a drawing or by some other
method based upon the element of chance; and (c) the holders of
the winning chances are to receive something of value.276
The first prong of New York's definition of a lottery requires that a
player, in this case a visitor who registers with an Internet company's
website, "pay or agree to pay something of value for chances." 2" Pursu-
ant to Penal Law § 225.00(6), something of value:
means any money or property, any token, object or article ex-
changeable for money or property, or any form of credit or
promise directly or indirectly contemplating transfer of money
or property or any interest therein, or involving extension of a
service, entertainment or a privilege of playing at a game or
scheme without charge.27
As U.S. West argued to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, personal
information about subscribers is indeed property worthy of Fifth
Amendment protection.2 9 Thus, the provision of this personal informa-
tion could theoretically qualify as the provision of property under New
York Penal Law § 225.00(6).
Additionally, because companies may sell this personal information
to third party information brokers, or may use this information in direct
targeted marketing to their own members, the information could also be
deemed a "token, object or article exchangeable for money or property."
Indeed, as the Toysmart debacle recently demonstrated, many companies
275. See People v. Kim, 585 N.Y.S.2d 310,313 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992).
276. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(10) (McKinney 2000).
277. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(10) (McKinney 2000).
278. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(6) (McKinney 2000).
279. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1224.
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have come to view this information as an important, and in some cases
vital, asset that they can sell for substantial amounts of money. 0 For
example, Bonus Blvd. freely discloses in its SEC filing that it may, upon
authorization from its members, use the personal information provided
by those members for its own purposes, or may sell the information to
third parties."' A visitor registering with a website could therefore con-
ceivably be viewed as having paid something of value for a chance in
the share distribution contest.
Concomitant with establishing that the player paid something of
value, the first prong of New York's statute also requires that the
chances be "represented and differentiated by numbers or by combina-
tions of numbers or by some other media, one or more of which chances
are to be designated the winning ones.' ' 2 Although the companies oper-
ating these share distribution contests do not disclose their methodology
for tracking each registrant, we can logically presume that the companies
necessarily assign each registrant some type of unique identifier distin-
guishing one registrant from another. Moreover, because these Internet
companies allow prospective contestants to enter by registering on their
websites, which are generally hosted on computer web servers, it is logi-
cal to presume that the companies identify the registrants' chances
electronically, and store them in electronic form, in some type of data-
base. Finally, because these Internet companies operate in cyberspace,
existing primarily on a system comprised of a multi-tiered architecture,
it would be illogical for them manually to draw the sweepstakes or con-
test when these computer systems are so well equipped for this very
task2 3 As such, it is also logical to presume that the computer system
will, at some point, designate one or more of the unique identifiers to be
the winning chance(s). Bearing the foregoing assumptions in mind, and
noting that New York's Penal Law allows for the unique identifier of the
chances to be represented by any "media," it would appear that a contest
that is hosted on, and determined by, a company's computer system
could satisfy this first prong.
The second prong of a lottery under New York law requires that "the
winning chances ... be determined by a drawing or by some other
280. Cf supra text accompanying notes 68-74 (discussing Toysmart's proposed sale of
personal information).
281. See BonusBoulevard, supra note 76, at 31.
282. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(10) (MeKinney 2000).
283. See, e.g., Office of the New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Investor Protec-
tion and Securities Bureau, Internet Bureau, "From Wall Street to Web Street-A Report on
the Problems and Promise of the Online Brokerage Industry" (Nov. 22, 1999) (discussing a
three-tiered architecture).
Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth
method based upon the element of chance. ''2 As an example of the ele-
ment of chance inherent in these Internet share distribution contests,
Bonus Blvd. discloses in its SEC registration filing that "100,000 Class
A shares will be awarded to one member who is selected at random as
the 'grand prize' winner of our sweepstakes contest..."21'
The third prong of New York's definition of a lottery requires that
"the holders of the winning chances ... receive something of value.
' 2 6
Arguably the shares of stock received by the contest winners, although
not yet publicly traded, possesses some value. Indeed, many of these
companies go to great pains to tout the value of their stock and to en-
courage people to register for shares.2 Even though the shares of stock
in these Internet companies lack a public market, the shares of stock
would still satisfy this final prong because the statute defines something
of value to include "any money or property, any token, object or article
exchangeable for money or property .. ."8 Therefore, furnishing shares
of stock to the winning contestants would likely be deemed adequate to
satisfy this final prong of New York's lottery statute.
As demonstrated by this analysis, it is feasible for these share distri-
bution contests to satisfy all of the elements of a lottery under New York
law. Presuming a company allowed New Yorkers to enter the lottery
from New York via registration, these share distribution contests could
be considered criminal enterprises in New York State. 9 As the New
York State Supreme Court ruled in People v. World Interactive Gaming
Corp., regardless of a computer server's location, "[t]he act of entering
the bet and transmitting the information from New York via the Internet
[is] adequate to constitute gambling activity within [] New York
State. 290 Similarly, even if a company locates the computer servers used
to host the Internet share distribution contest outside of New York State,
by merely allowing New York residents to enter the contest through the
furnishing of something of value, in this case personal information, the
284. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 225.00(10) (McKinney 2000).
285. Bonus Boulevard, supra note 76, at 42 (emphasis added).
286. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(10) (McKinney 2000).
287. See, e.g., WebWorks, supra note 5 ("Assuming you received the full 63 shares, the
total net asset value of your shares (on paper), will be approximately $2,419.20 in theory.");
WowAuction, supra note 7 ("In related [I]ntemet auction news, City Auction was acquired by
Ticketmaster in late February ... for ... approx. $54 million ... cNet recently bought Auc-
tiongate for $5.8 million .... And at the market close on March 8, 1999, eBay's total stock
worth was over $20 billion!!.").
288. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(6) (McKinney 2000).
289. See People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., No. 404428/98, 1999 WL 591995,
at * I (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 22, 1999).
290. Il at 4.
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contest could be deemed to occur in New York and thus violate New
York State law.
An examination of other state statutes yields potentially similar re-
sults. California's Constitution bars the legislature from authorizing
lotteries, except for the California State Lottery, expressly authorized in
a subsequent clause.29' As the California Gambling Control Act sets forth
in its legislative findings and declarations, "[s]tate law prohibits com-
mercially operated lotteries .... ,,29 Section 319 of California's Penal
Law defines a lottery as:
any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by
chance, among persons who have paid or promised to pay any
valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining such property
or a portion of it, or for any share or any interest in such prop-
erty, upon any agreement, understanding, or expectation that it
is to be distributed or disposed of by lot or chance, whether
called a lottery, raffle, or gift-enterprise, or by whatever name
the same may be known.293
Pursuant to California Penal Code § 320, any person who "contrives,
sets up, proposes, or draws any lottery, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
2
'
94
As the California Supreme Court observed in California Gasoline Re-
tailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., a lottery under California law is
comprised of three elements: 1) the disposition of property; 2) upon a
contingency determined by chance; and 3) to a person who has paid a
valuable consideration in return for the chance of winning the prize.295
With regard to the first element, there can be little doubt that the
distribution of shares of stock to contest winners constitutes a scheme
for the disposition of property. Furthermore, companies such as Bonus
Blvd. freely disclose that they distribute this property based upon
chance, the chance generally being a drawing of all of the registered
people on a given website.296 Thus, these share distribution contests
could also satisfy the second element of the California Gasoline
Retailers' test.
291. See CAL. CONsT. art IV, § 19 (amended March 8,2000).
292. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19801(a) (Deering 2000). In order to clarify the purpose
of the Gambling Control Act as it relates to lotteries, § 19806 states that "[n]othing in this
chapter [the Gambling Control Act] shall be construed in any way to permit or authorize any
conduct made unlawful by Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 319) of... Title 9 of Part I
of the Penal Code, or any local ordinance." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19806 (Deering 2000).
293. CAL. PENAL CODE § 319 (Deering 1999).
294. CAL. PENAL CODE § 320 (Deering 1999).
295. See California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 330 P.2d 778, 782
(1958).
296. See BonusBoulevard, supra note 76, at 42-43.
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The final element requires that a person pay a "valuable considera-
tion" in return for entering the scheme and securing a chance to win a
prize. Once again, drawing upon the SEC's finding of value in the per-
sonal information provided by individuals during the registration
process, as well as the value that both the Internet community and fed-
eral and state legislators have assigned to this information, one could
assert that the information constitutes "valuable consideration" under
217California law. As such, it could be argued that these Internet share
distribution contests constitute lotteries under California law, and are
thus illegal in California as well.
CONCLUSION: STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH
Although it may be premature to judge the long-term effects of the
SEC's Orders requiring registration of Internet-based share distribution
programs, it appears that the message has reached the Internet commu-
nity. For example, a November 16, 1999 Wall Street Journal article
noted that "[t]wo upstart online companies that aren't yet public-
DoctorSurf.com, Inc. of Largo, Fla., and YouNetwork Corp. of New
York-have quietly received the green light to give away SEC-
registered shares to surfers signing up on their websites. '29
Merely complying with federal securities registration requirements,
however, does not in any way ensure compliance with other statutes that
may be implicated by these share distribution programs. For instance,
although states have not yet enforced their pyramid scheme or gambling
prohibitions against companies operating share distribution programs,
public outcry over the collection, use and sale of personal information
continues to grow. It is feasible that public sentiment could eventually
pressure regulators and prosecutors to undertake initiatives to crack
down on the collection and use of this personal information. If so, states
may look to any means available for deterring the inappropriate collec-
tion and use of this information, such as the enforcement of pyramid
scheme and lottery prohibitions. As states continue to pass new privacy
legislation, these share distribution programs could also be imperiled by
more restrictive privacy laws.
Aside from the legal considerations, some Internet-based share
distribution programs also risk running afoul of ethical boundaries. For
297. See supra Part II, for a more detailed discussion of the "value" of this personal in-
formation.
298. Gregory Zuckerman, SEC Clears Web Firms' Stock Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Nov.
16, 1999, at C1.
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example, the program being proposed by DoctorSurf.com, Inc.
("DoctorSurf") has raised eyebrows in the medical community. Pursu-
ant to DoctorSurf's share distribution program, "[t]he first 250,000
doctors who join DoctorSurf.com can get 100 shares of Doctor-
Surf.com simply by providing detailed information about
themselves." 2'9 The distribution of DoctorSurf shares to doctors, which
in itself would not appear to implicate any ethical concerns, becomes
more problematic, however, when the company accepts advertising
from medical and drug companies.Y In assessing the ethics of such a
program, Dr. Herbert Rakatansky, Chairman of the American Medical
Association's ethics council noted, "there's no prohibition against
doctors buying stock in the open market in, say, a pharmaceutical
company because the number of shares outstanding are so great that a
doctor can't influence the stock price by his prescribing patterns. '0 '
The same might not hold true, however, when doctors own shares in a
small lightly traded start-up Internet company which accepts advertis-
ing from medical and drug companies. Bearing in mind that many
informational websites are valued based upon their advertising reve-
nue, if the prescribing patterns of doctors were in any way able to
influence the advertising dollars spent by medical and drug companies
on the DoctorSurf site, such patterns could realistically affect the value
of DoctorSurf's stock.
Another potential ethical consideration might arise because medi-
cal and drug advertisers on a site owned primarily by doctors could
arguably gain some competitive advantage through the arrangement.
For example, consumers might view an advertiser's affiliation with a
website sponsored and owned primarily by doctors as an implicit en-
dorsement of the products advertised. As Dr. Rakatansky observed,
"any possible ethical issues ... turn on who would control the site's
content and whether advertising and content would be clearly distin-
guishable. ' 3  Clear and conspicuous disclaimers might be useful to
some extent, but would they truly resolve all of the potential ethical
issues raised by such a website?
These concerns are by no means restricted to Internet-based com-
panies owned by doctors. For example, a New York Times article in
November 1999 uncovered potential conflicts of interest that have
arisen when cardiologists have promoted devices that they invented in
299. Id. at C22.
300. Id. (noting that DoctorSurf has publicly stated that it is considering accepting ad-
vertising by medical and drug companies on its website).
301. Id. atCLC22.
302. Id. at C22.
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return for stock in the companies that own the rights to those de-
vices.'O' As the New York Times article noted, "[a]t bottom, some
cardiologists fear that the influence of potential riches has distorted
medicine's search for truth.""" To deal with these conflicts, cardiolo-
gists have adopted a loose policy of voluntary disclosure.9
Unfortunately, these disclosure policies apparently have suffered from
numerous flaws and have not worked as well as many would have
liked."'
Similarly, one could foresee conflicts of interest arising in the
context of doctor-owned Internet websites aligned with drug and
medical companies. For example, what conflicts might arise if a doctor
who owns shares in DoctorSurf decides to publish an article on the
website reviewing her use of a product sold by a medical or drug com-
pany that advertises on the site?
Although these ethical considerations might seem somewhat ab-
stract, they serve to illustrate that in addition to addressing the
applicability of securities laws, as well as state pyramid scheme and
gambling prohibitions, companies must also review their share distri-
bution programs to ensure that they comply with various ethical tenets.
Without theorizing how this new chapter in securities regulation might
conclude, this article has illustrated the considerations that these com-
panies may wish to ponder before implementing their share
distribution programs.
It has been said that when one purchases a horse, it is advisable to
look into the horse's mouth and examine the horse's teeth, as this is
the best way to ascertain the horse's true age, and thus, to learn
whether the seller has been truthful about the animal he is selling.
Contrary to the proverb that one should not look a gift horse in the
mouth, before accepting an offer of free shares of stock, and giving
away valuable personal information, one should investigate the
veracity of the claims made, as well as the potential pitfalls of the of-
fer. Only by looking the gift horse squarely in the mouth can one hope
303. Eichenwald and Kolata, Hidden Interest-A Special Report; When Physicians Dou-
ble as Entrepreneurs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at Al, C16.
304. Id. at Al (noting that in the early 1990s, Dr. Maurice Buchbinder served as a prin-
cipal investigator in studies for the Rotablader, a tiny drill used to remove plaque from
arteries, while holding a stake in the company that sold the device, a stake worth millions of
dollars. A few years later in 1993, however, the Food and Drug Administration found signifi-
cant deficiencies in Dr. Buchbinder's research, "including failures to conduct proper follow-
up or to appropriately report problems experienced by patients. The University subsequently
banned him from performing other experiments on patients.").
305. Id.
306- Id.
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to verify that the seller is actually offering a ground floor opportunity
in a potentially lucrative and legal program, and not an old nag suf-
fering from statutory and ethical maladies.
